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Within the discussion of EU relations of Turkey, it is clear that until recent the 
importance of public opinion and its formation have been neglected from related 
research. Although the existent research deals with individual level factors shaping 
public opinion, this thesis proposes an alternative approach that public opinion 
formation is highly related to political cues that are provided from certain government 
institutions and political elite, among other determinants of national economic growth, 
tendency to trust in the national government and parliament. The decline in public 
support in Turkey regarding EU membership has been analyzed and tendencies within 
the period of 2005-2014 are presented in order to provide explanations to the 
association of the public opinion formation to the related propositions. In order to 
observe the relation of external and internal factors regarding policy formation of the 
political elite, the historical background of Turkish membership project to EU has been 
touched upon, and related political discourses have been analyzed to correlate public 
opinion formation to elite messages in the respective period. In doing this, the thesis 
aims to contribute to public opinion analyses of Turkey regarding EU membership 
process, while embracing Eurobarometer public opinion surveys from 2005 to 2014. 
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Anahtar Kelimeler: Türkiye-AB ilişkileri, Türk kamu görüşü, AB üyeliği, politik 
ipucu, tercih oluşumu 
 
 
Türkiye-AB ilişkileri konusunda kamu görüşünün ve bunun şekillenmesinin yakın 
zamana kadar araştırmalarda gözardı edildiği görülmektedir. Mevcut araştırmalar kamu 
görüşünü bireysel düzeyde şekillendiren faktörlere değinse de, bu tez buna alternatif bir 
yaklaşım getirerek, kamu görüşü şekillenmesinde ülkedeki ekonomik büyüme, milli 
hükümete ve parlamentoya güven eğilimleri faktörlerinin yanısıra hükümet 
müesseseleri ve politik elit tarafından sunulan politik ipuçlarının da oldukça etkili 
olduğunu savunmaktadır. Türkiye’de AB üyeliği ile ilgili halk desteğinin yıllar içinde 
düşüşü analiz edilerek, kamu görüşü ile verilen önermeler arasındaki karşılıklı ilişkiye 
ışık tutmak amacı ile ilgili dönemdeki eğilimler incelenmiştir. Politik elitin politika 
oluşturmasında etkili olan iç ve dış faktörleri incelemek üzere, Türkiye’nin AB’ye 
üyelik projesinin tarihsel arka planına değinilmiş, aynı zamanda dönemin politikacıları 
tarafından yapılan söylemler kamu görüşü şekillenmesinin elit mesajlarıyla ilişkisinin 
ortaya konması amacıyla ele alınmıştır. Böylece, bu tez Türkiye’nin AB’ye üyeliği 
süreci ile ilgili kamu görüşü analizine katkıda bulunmayı amaçlamaktadır. Bunun için 
2005-2014 yıllarını kapsayan Avrobarometre kamuoyu anketlerinden yararlanılmıştır. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Turkey’s accession to the European Union has occupied both sides excessively over the 
years, especially in terms of future prospects and possible impacts on both parties. 
There have been various debates especially after the opening of accession negotiations 
in 2005, on how Turkey’s prospective membership would change the dynamics of 
European Union, how EU membership would affect Turkey in terms of social, 
economic and political factors, while possible mutual benefits such integration would 
bring along are expressed. However, contrary to the vast research on Turkey-EU 
relations, the matter of Turkish public opinion regarding Turkey’s membership to the 
European Union stays as an area where to date little research has been conducted.  
This unpopularity of public opinion studies within the literature may be linked to the 
fact that Turkish membership to the EU seems to be predominantly driven by the 
political elite since now(Şenyuva, 2006). Despite the importance laid on the ‘real 
process’ of the accession, it would be fair to mention the importance of public opinion 
especially in the fulfillment process of the membership criteria, particularly in the 
harmonization and orientation phases. This orientation phase would include adjustments 
to Europeanness, extending threshold of tolerance against different cultures, religions 
and local habits and –the most responsibility incurring for the Turkish case I suppose- 
consensually leaving some traditional praxis.  
Contrary to the Turkish case, regarding the membership process of Poland, 
Slomczyniski and Shabad touch upon 3 major factors for the importance of public 
opinion.(Şenyuva, 2006)  These factors are referenda being conducted about becoming 
a member or not, involvement of EU membership in national electoral appeals and 
partisan debates, and the impact of EU membership in Central and Eastern European 
countries in terms of consolidation of democratic systems and market economy 
(Slomczynski & Shabad, 2003).  Although these factors would practically fit the 
Turkish case, as Şenyuva suggests, Turkish public opinion’s sphere of impact would be 
much broader to research on (Şenyuva, 2006).  
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Turkish accession to the EU has already been discussed from various aspects until now, 
since Turkish society as a matter of fact carries significant differences when compared 
to the societies of the continental Europe in particular. The characteristics of the Turkish 
society that would arise questions about joining a ‘European’ supranational organization 
would be the ‘culture’. Cultural differences including religious belief system appear to 
be tough when it comes to adaptation to ‘European’ manners, and requires great 
endeavor from the public. Turkey, being the largest dominantly Muslim country 
negotiating on accession to EU, has to implement strategic policies that would carry the 
negotiation phase to further levels while preserving support from the public.  
The existing research on Turkish public opinion focuses on several determinants that 
would shape individual preferences of citizens in case of EU membership, such as 
religiosity, utilitarian considerations, Euro-skepticism and attachment to national 
identity. These determinants are based on individual level inferences that are made 
through personal observations building up on the existing judgments. This assumption 
makes these determinants vulnerable to instant changes and misinformation, since these 
factors affecting public opinion formation are mainly based on already existing 
information, impression and even prejudices that are of course highly receptive to any 
alternation.  
Beside individual level preferences regarding EU membership, formation process of 
Turkish public opinion no wonder is to be associated with many other patterns. This 
thesis proposes 4 main propositions that are claimed to be determinative of public 
support in Turkey towards EU membership. These propositions embrace Turkish public 
trust in the national government, Turkish public support to the national parliament, 
progress of Turkish economy and finally cues provided from Turkish political elite to be 
the key determinants of Turkish public opinion on EU membership. Furthermore, I 
claim that cues provided from Turkish political elite is among the most influential 
factors in shaping Turkish public opinion, since it encompasses the power of strategic 
manipulation of information delivered to public.  
In order to present the relationship between support for EU membership in Turkey with 
the discourses of the political elite, statements of government officials are to be 
analyzed in a contextual manner, while associated with the relevant year’s national and 
international developments. It is intended to associate the survey data of between years 
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of 2005-2014 on Turkish public opinion towards European Union membership, the 
image of EU, Turkish public’s tendency to trust in national government and national 
parliament with historical developments and their exposure to the public within Turkish 
official’s discourses, in order to present the correlation, they carry regarding public 
opinion formation in Turkey.  
The trends will be analyzed separately for each year, relying on the Eurobarometer 
survey reports EU publishes each year twice regarding national public surveys of 
candidate countries. Chapter 1 will include the review of literature on Turkish public 
opinion formation on EU membership and theoretical framework on how public 
preferences are shaped through the above-mentioned determinants. The second chapter 
will follow with the historical background of Turkey’s EU membership project 
concerning developments that would be reflected on Turkish public in particular, while 
touching upon the foreign policy approach Turkey has adapted especially covering the 
term of the AKP government. The third chapter then will follow with the survey and 
economic data and its analysis of fluctuations over the years. The fourth and the last 
chapter will then analyze the correlation with the data and the probable determinants 
that have been provoked regarding each year’s developments that are reflected by the 
attitude of political elite and cues they have delivered throughout the process as I claim 
to be among strongest factors of influence.  
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CHAPTER 1.  
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
1.1. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The complicated process of European Integration both on domestic and supranational 
levels has long been lead and steered by political and intellectual elite. This precedent 
continued until just recent, and in the meantime very important steps just as Schengen 
Agreement and creation of Eurozone have been taken. Within this period and while 
European Union horizontally extends to 28 members, the issue of public opinion has 
continued to be regarded as less important in the decision making process. In other 
words, the public has not been considered as an agency of decision-making, but the 
espouser and implementer without much query.  
This notion however has proved to be wrong with the stagnation of broader integration 
procedure as the Draft Treaty establishing a constitution for Europe draw negative 
reaction including rejection from referenda held in France and Netherlands. The 
rejection of Lisbon Treaty in 2008 in Ireland follows and the idea that the public 
opinion plays a great role in policymaking both in domestic and supranational platforms 
arouse. Çiğdem Kentmen dates this change of perception to 1994 referendum of 
Norway and underlines that elite opinion should not be the only reference, not only 
concerning member countries but also the candidate countries (Kentmen, 2008).  
In particular to the candidate countries, Özgehan Şenyuva draws attention to the EU 
harmonization process they go through with major financial and administrative reforms 
affecting the daily lives of the respective community(Şenyuva, 2006). At this point, 
another major factor integrating the public to the decision making process comes to 
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light. Besides referenda on the membership or integration issues, specific reforms 
regarding EU harmonization would depend on public in terms of adaptation and 
implementation.  
With regards to Turkish case, the lack of importance laid on public opinion until recent, 
is reflected to the research in parallel; studies regarding Turkish public support to EU 
membership has remained very few when compared to the vast literature on other topics 
about Turkey-EU relations. Ali Çarkoğlu touches upon the contrast that the rich 
literature regarding TR-EU relations containing complex socio-economic and cultural 
challenges is at variance with the lack of public opinion studies that are of great 
relevance(Çarkoğlu, 2003).  
The existing literature on public opinion on EU membership in Turkey focuses on 
major individual factors to be influential in public opinion formation. These major 
factors researched by scholars mainly indicate arguments concerning religiosity, 
utilitarian considerations, attachment to national identity and Euro-skepticism. These 
variables do present the characteristics of groups regarding against or pro-EU 
considerations, while these also constitute the basis of individual level determinants 
shaping public opinion in Turkey. These variables are referred as to be the main 
obstructive or encouraging motives for EU membership that show alteration depending 
on developments of the respective period. In other words, Turkish public support 
depends on the changes over these variable along with the evolving developments 
between Turkey and the EU. Although the literature regarding Turkish public opinion 
toward European Union membership focuses mainly on these variables and the 
arguments that are formed rely on the comparative nature of these factors with the 
support measured for the EU membership among the country, our argument that 
Turkish public opinion towards European Union membership takes form by being 
influenced by the political elite’s policy making choices and most importantly by 
political cueing lacks substantially within the literature.  
This argument within the theoretical framework will be further examined, but first the 
approaches to the determinants of public opinion in Turkey within the literature are to 
be viewed.  
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Religiosity 
The factor of religiosity especially in Turkish public opinion studies seems to be fair to 
be surveyed, since Turkey would be the largest dominantly Muslim populated candidate 
country to the European Union that has been long identified as a Christian Club. This 
approach indicated the factor of religiosity to many studies with enthusiasm, however 
the findings did not meet the expectations that this factor would be of great importance 
defining Turkish public’s preferences regarding EU membership. Research on the factor 
of religiosity regarding the public opinion of Turkish citizens toward EU membership 
reveals contradictory results(Çarkoğlu & Kentmen, 2011). The reason for this 
contradiction is claimed to be the insufficiency of the existing data on the issue. Some 
scholars have argued that religiosity is not among the factors that strictly shape public’s 
view towards EU, while other claim that their findings present that in cases where the 
individual lays greater importance on religion and religious practices, the support he/she 
would give to EU membership falls significantly.  
As Kentmen implies, it cannot be denied that religion has a great role in identity 
formation, however for the membership to a supranational entity, rather utility based 
factors count. Kentmen find that ‘individuals’ support for Turkey’s accession to the EU 
does not vary significantly with the strength of their Islamic beliefs(Kentmen, 2008). 
Ali Çarkoğlu and Çiğdem Kentmen follow with another research that also suggests that 
religiosity is insignificant in determining support for EU membership in 
Turkey(Çarkoğlu & Kentmen, 2011), such as Çarkoğlu and Glüpker-Kesebir in their 
comparative analysis of three countries Croatia, Macedonia and Turkey 
implied(Çarkoğlu & Glüpker-Kesebir, 2016).  
In Turkey, religiosity in fact plays a great role in politics. However, the religiosity 
factor regarding EU membership in Turkey has to be approached from a significant 
perspective. Since AKP identifies itself with religious characteristics, its supporters 
associate the party and its leaders with Islam easily, while appointing them as the 
warden of their religion and freedom of religious practices. Therefore, any positive 
attitude from the AKP government towards EU would not be associated with any threat 
against Turkish public’s religion or their Islamic rituals due to the unconditional trust 
they have.  
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Utilitarian expectations 
The hypothesis claiming that individual support to EU membership would be more 
likely if membership carries positive effects on national and hence individual economic 
circumstances is referred as utilitarian expectations hypothesis. This hypothesis carried 
out through cost-benefit analysis also asserts that such positive effect on economic 
circumstances would push other factors into the background. As Özgehan Şenyuva puts, 
if this argument is to be implemented on Turkish public, the individuals considering EU 
membership as advantageous in terms of utility-based factors, they would overlook 
factors such as national identity or religion(Şenyuva, 2006).  
These utilitarian expectations would not only be considered as financial economic 
benefits, but also as human capital. Since “Turkey is a low-skilled country compared 
with the Western European member states’ average, and the unification of Turkey with 
the EU will be a unification of a skill-scarce country with a skill-abundant group of 
states”(Çarkoğlu & Kentmen, 2011). This would bring mutual benefits since unskilled 
labor might move to EU, while European firms might benefit from low-cost unskilled 
labor by moving their businesses to Turkey.  
Some scholars regarding utility-based expectations argue that if the economic reforms 
conducted in order to comply with EU affect national economy in a negative way, this 
would decrease the support of public to the membership(Hooghe & Marks, 2005). 
Regarding utilitarian expectations, the observation of the current economic status of 
nation and individuals is indeed easy and therefore less prone to manipulation. 
However, when economic prospects and anticipations are taken into account, their 
government depending upon the intention of policymaking might misinform individuals 
and manipulate their predictions.  
However, according to a survey conducted focusing on support to EU membership after 
2008 crisis put forward that as in many candidate countries, public in Turkey exhibited 
negative response to a certain extent to the respective issue(Çarkoğlu & Glüpker-
Kesebir, 2016) 
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National Identity 
The factor of national identity seems to find itself a substantive place within public 
opinion literature regarding EU membership, since many scholars touch upon this factor 
under different headings. Since European integration continues vertically and 
horizontally at a great speed, discussions about preservation of national identity along 
with possible adaptation problems warm up. Adaptation problems might be 
correspondent, as Europeans already had hard times accepting the Turkish-Muslim 
populace present in Europe. Religion of course constitutes a great portion of identity 
formation; however when researchers take national identity apart with it-set to zero- it 
still presents a major factor affecting public attitudes against EU(Kentmen, 2008). 
(Dostal, Akçalı, & Antonsich, 2011)(Wutrich, Ardağ, & Uğur, 2012)A reason for 
national identity being that influential against EU-related issues is that Turkish 
population hold the perception about Europe and Europeans as an ‘enemy’, if not as 
‘other’ dated back to many centuries.  
Regarding another diverseness between Turkish national identity and the European, 
Ayşe Evrensel touches upon the formation processes of several national values. 
Evrensel puts   
“Nevertheless, current post-modern European society with its egalitarian 
universalism, freedom, democracy, accountability, and individualism along with its 
promotion of independent existence from religion, nondiscriminatory attitudes 
towards marginalized groups, and strong civil society has its roots in the events 
that started almost five hundred years ago. By contrast in Turkey, ideas such as 
secularism were imposed by the state without any internal social dynamic or 
significant popular movement behind it” (Evrensel, 2013) 
This view posing an obstacle in the way compatibility and adaptation to European 
Union has been discussed and defined as ‘an ambiguous one’, creating difficulties for 
both sides. (Dostal, Akçalı, & Antonsich, 2011)and(Çarkoğlu & Glüpker-Kesebir, 
2016)agree that national identity affects support for EU membership when in exclusive 
forms.  
Çarkoğlu with Çiğdem Kentmen define national identity as so that it “will provide 
individuals with feelings of belonging, distinctiveness and increased self-esteem, which 
can result in inter-group discrimination”(Çarkoğlu & Kentmen, 2011). It follows with 
the argument that EU might be seen as a threat to the national identity, since the states 
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have to follow some legislation decided upon within the supranational body 
collectively. This may be seen as weakening of sovereignty by many, together with 
lifted national boundaries, use of common currency and many other common symbols 
of the union.  
Of course the public would form individual opinions about how entrance to EU would 
affect in terms of national identity, however this determinant may still be delivered to 
public toned down together with adverse covenants.  
Regarding Kurdish and Alevi groups, Çarkoğlu and Kentmen suggests that these groups 
might well support EU membership, since EU membership presents rights and freedoms 
to ethnic and sectarian minorities(Çarkoğlu & Kentmen, 2011).  
Euro-skepticism 
Just after the accession talks begun, many signs have emerged signaling that EU rather 
want to propose Turkey’s privileged partnership rather than full membership. As Tarık 
Oğuzlu exemplifies, the Negotiation Framework Document alone states that the 
outcome of negotiations cannot be predicted precisely until the end and put strict 
statements for EU’s right to keep Turkey out of several policies such as free movement 
of people and goods(Oğuzlu, 2012). The reason for EU’s reservations are somehow 
clear since Turkey would displace Germany with its population of 80 million and 
change internal dynamics that are procedurally based on population sizes of the member 
states(Dostal, Akçalı, & Antonsich, 2011) 
Reservations and discussions on cultural integration no wonder fuelled Turkey’s 
skepticism towards EU. Besides Turkish response to European attitude, Oğuzlu also 
suggests that Turkish public grows reservations regarding Europe’s postmodern vision 
of a more decentralized system might pose a threat against Turkey’s integrity(Oğuzlu, 
2012). 
Euro-skepticism, taken into account as a single determinant actually attribute to many 
others. Ali Çarkoğlu defines Euro-skepticism as “ a weighted summary of attitudes on 
EU policy towards the Turkish bid for membership, European’s general failure to 
understand Turks, the perceived bias in the EU’s evaluation of the Turkish application 
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and the perceived threat of losing national identity when a country becomes a full 
member(Çarkoğlu, 2003) 
As expected, Euro-skeptic attitude tends to decrease support for EU membership. The 
prolonged process of Turkish accession to the EU of course would create exasperation, 
and make both policy makers and public abandon hope, which would eventually feed 
Euro-skeptic attitudes. The accession process lasting for long might well create such 
image of government’s failure in the eyes of the public, and therefore the policy makers 
might have to make contrary statements in order to shape public attitude.  
1.2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
The approach I pursue within the theoretical framework intends to be adherent to the 
general outlook to public opinion research.  However, the unique characteristics of 
Turkish public possess as a matter of course necessitate orientation and gradual 
examination of the argument that public opinion in Turkey designates the membership 
process to EU. It is well expected that each society to present different political 
characteristics due to its sui generis structure formed by its historical background, 
cultural construct, religious belief system, group dynamics, openness to bias, to global 
or cross-cultural interaction and many other deep-rooted factors. The characteristics of 
Turkish public, especially in the opinion formation process, however expected to bear 
certain principles, such as public opinion and policy formation being in a reciprocal 
relationship in terms of their influences on one another. In other words, Turkish policy 
makers are well influenced by the factors shaping public opinion and public support, 
while public opinion is highly vulnerable to messages provided by the political elite, 
which I claim is valid for EU membership issues in our case.  
The reciprocal relationship should be the focus of further examination, since the 
underlying intentions of Turkish political elite’s policy choices are extremely relevant 
when the motivational factors behind the political cues are taken into consideration. 
Turkish accession process which gained great pace under the rule of the AKP 
government indeed painted a promising picture. The extent of the reforms conducted by 
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the government in particular showed great improvement in Turkish EU membership 
project.  
Characteristics of the Turkish public along with the attitudes of EU member states 
reflected on prospective Turkish membership gives the process a distinctive nature. 
Taking these into consideration, trust in the national government, trust in the national 
parliament, progress of the Turkish economy and influential to all these factors cues 
provided by the political elite I claim are to be most influential in shaping Turkish 
public opinion. In order to analyze further the extent of influence, I come up with 4 
main propositions that are to be analyzed through Eurobarometer survey data and 
related discourses of the political elite.  
The literature on the support of EU membership regarding economic considerations 
suggests that the effect of joining EU on the national economy would have distinctive 
effects on individuals with different economic backgrounds. This suggestion indeed 
would be applicable to Turkish case as such; individuals with higher income may well 
perceive EU membership to bring along better economic conditions, while individuals 
with lower income may not be totally optimistic about Turkey gaining economic 
benefits from EU membership that will enhance their quality of life in the long run.  
The effect of EU membership on the public opinion in Turkey towards EU I suggest is 
more complicated. Since Turkey has been waiting for accession to EU for a very long 
period of time, Turkish public would tend to view Turkish membership to the EU as a 
remote possibility. Therefore, Turkish public will not choose to lay their back to EU on 
better economic conditions to develop as the last call, but instead place emphasis on 
their national economy to develop individually. It would be fair to expect that a great 
fraction to live in Turkey that would view EU membership project as an enhancer of the 
national economy on the long run. However, I claim that, EU membership on this 
equation does stand for means rather than ends, and Turkish public support for EU 
membership will decrease if Turkish economy would be able to develop positive growth 
individually. This claim will be analyzed further in the following chapters with the help 
of statistical data derived from various sources regarding Turkish economic growth and 
public support for EU membership in Turkey, after its extent is touched upon below.  
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Proposition 1: Turkish public support for EU membership declines when there is a 
positive growth in the Turkish economy.  
This proposition holds the expectation that objective measures of the national economy 
are influential in shaping public support for EU membership, along with the assumption 
of individuals creating their opinions on rational basis. Furthermore, Kentmen states 
“Scholars suggest that rational individuals evaluate policy-makers whose decisions 
affect national economic conditions on the basis of their economic 
performance”(Kentmen, 2008). 
The argument of economic measures are expected to influence public opinion towards 
EU membership rely on the assumption that the rational individuals view EU 
membership as to affect their national economy, since they would hold EU accountable 
for national economic conditions, which in turn will impose effects on life standards of 
the citizens. Therefore, scholars view economic benefits to positively influence public 
opinion for EU membership, in instance of EU proposing promissory impacts on the 
national economies. In other words, if the individuals believe that the membership of 
EU will exert positive influence on their national economies for certain, they tend to 
support membership with the expectation of gaining economic benefits out of it.  
Regarding economic prospects affecting public opinion formation towards EU 
membership, scholars suggest that human capital as well constitutes a large room in the 
context. Human capital model suggest that rational individuals who view EU 
membership to exert influence on their own economic conditions are more prone to 
view this prospect as to bring along different job opportunities, higher wages or 
developed working conditions (Kentmen, 2008).  This expectation of course have to be 
evaluated with the conditions of free movement of people, capital and services, which 
in Turkish membership case create serious reservations for EU member states to the 
extent that they have proposed Turkish membership to contain permanent safeguards 
regarding free mobility of labor. Therefore, the human capital model in terms of its 
positive influence on EU membership in the eyes of Turkish public would not constitute 
a great incentive as well.  
The literature on public opinion identifies alternative explanations besides economic 
considerations such as possible effects ‘political cueing’. Scholars in regards to 
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formation of public opinion lay importance on political cues delivered by the political 
leaders to the public(Çarkoğlu, 2003). This explanation of course needs attention to 
what extent political elites and government institutions provide information to the 
public about the membership process to the EU. It is argued that this approach rises 
along with the assumption that the multi-level system of governance of EU creates 
space for domestic political actors to promote and implement policies in direction of 
their interest(Kentmen, 2008). This position paves the way for political actors to 
influence public support in the way they prefer while conducting policies that will 
secure their electoral support. Hence, the position of domestic political elite on EU 
related issues and cues they provide regarding these are highly influential in public 
opinion formation process.  
Proposition 2: Turkish public support for EU membership increases when cues provided 
by the political leaders present positive attitudes towards EU membership 
The approach of successful policy makers having the ability to shape the public support 
by political cue giving and mobilizing masses towards their preferences has been focus 
of several works on public opinion. This approach covers that successful policy makers 
might have the ability to shape public’s views by political cueing and mobilizing 
masses towards their point of interest. Certain events and developments regarding 
policy choices might create undesired situations for the political elite, and thus political 
elites find themselves at a point where the required prospective policy choices of their 
interest threatening the support they acquire from the public. Hence, political actors 
may find themselves at a point where they have to implement certain tools in order to 
carry out necessary policies while securing public support concerning their electoral 
power in the future. These tools comprise of several methods that aim to shape public’s 
view so that the public may not hold the policy-makers to account for any unsupported 
or undesired case situation. Agenda setting, misinformation or framing stands here as 
the main tools that policy-makers make use of in order to manage political maneuvering 
and mobilization of the public.  In other words, these tools provide “[…]—in a positive, 
negative, or neutral manner—an organizing principle to the structure of a news story 
and therefore potentially to citizens’ understanding of and thinking about political, 
economic, and social topics”(Vreese, Boomgaarden, & Semetko, 2010)(McCombs, 
2013). Ali Çarkoğlu touches upon the use of these tools in his work on public opinion 
by emphasizing the importance of misinformation in this process(Çarkoğlu, 2003).  
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‘Misinformation’ as a broad concept stands here as policy-maker’s intentions to 
manipulate the information that is to conveyed to the public. However at this point, the 
communication channels between the political elite and the public gains great 
importance. From a traditional outlook, the mass media has been and still is regarded as 
the main communication channel between these two parties, and carries the role to 
deliver information on the developments on the political sphere to the public level.  The 
existence of the information media as a third party between the political actors and the 
public eases the manipulation of information in the process of delivery, and thus enables 
politicians to make strategic maneuvers in a less complicated manner. Maxwell 
McCombs made emphasis on media’s important role in his work as “For nearly all of 
the concerns on the public agenda, citizens deal with a second-hand reality, a reality that 
is structured by journalists’ reports about these events and situations”(McCombs, 2013) 
Besides the components of mass media, i.e. television broadcast, newspaper magazines, 
radio, social media today in particular requires special attention. Until recent, tools of 
social media has become more significant within the public opinion research and 
apparently it is started to be perceived as one of the most influential data source public 
has access to. When the focus is political cues that are delivered with the aim of 
influencing and manipulating public support, the participation of people into the wide 
communication channels especially through social media at one point posed a problem 
to the policy makers, since true and fast information would be provided to great masses 
through these channels, considering that it would be hard to exert manipulation to the 
social media channels. The reservation of the Turkish government against public’s 
limitless access to the social media tools has been apparent recently, and it can be 
explained so, that in such instance the scenery the government would want to create 
with the desired political cues would be damaged.  
When mass media in Turkey is taken into consideration, it can be said that Turkish 
policy makers have long been manipulating it as well, rather by unlawful acts of by 
menace. The situation in Turkey concerning mass media and freedom of expression 
does not paint a promising picture. The manipulation that is desired to be created in the 
Turkish case does not only constitute the benefits of delivering the message from a third 
channel to the public, but the pressure the government apply on the mass media through 
acts of menace. Many tools of mass media, i.e. television, radio, newspapers, magazines 
and many others has been pressured and manipulated by certain political elite, and they 
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were requested to broadcast filtering news items if they show any sign of dissidence. 
Even the tools of social media, twitter for instance, has been exposed to confinement in 
many cases. Although this scenery is highly worrying in regards to freedom of 
expression, freedom on information and many other freedoms, existence of such trend is 
highly instrumental concerning the efficiency of political cues on public opinion 
formation.  
The fact that public’s influence on the implementation of government policies surfaces 
the need for policy makers to follow rigorous policy making strategies. Some necessary 
policy changes that are promoted by the government may well get reaction from the 
public, which has been the case for several times concerning EU membership. Scheve 
and Gabel state this modality as “The view of public toward EU membership does also 
include the necessary policy changes that EU criteria require, which would affect the 
public more perceptibly. Therefore, the public may harshly reject the necessary policy 
changes regarding EU harmonization”(Gabel & Scheve, 2007). Çarkoğlu touches upon 
this issue with the example of abolition of death penalty and other sensitive legislation 
regarding education in other languages such as Kurdish. He argues that through 
strategic political resistance and maneuvering, implementation of such sensitive issues 
would not cause any loss in electoral support(Çarkoğlu, 2003). While strategic political 
decision-making phase is therefore of great importance, the tone and attitude of the 
political elite throughout the process especially when conveying relevant messages/cues 
are critical as well.  
The literature on Turkey’s membership to the EU demonstrates high interest on 
individual preferences regarding public opinion as a matter of course. However, the 
formation of individual preferences taken into account within the literature is generally 
based on the assumption that individuals have access to true information, if they have to 
any. Most of the discussed variables depending on personal preferences may alternate 
from day to day, since the formation of these preferences is directly linked to the 
information derived. Therefore, the essential factor that would affect all of the 
preference formation process is the accessibility to true information and manipulation 
exerted by the political elite.  
This argument however has a counterpart that is the desire of the policy makers getting 
re-elected. This argument diverges from other determinants analyzed, since latter hold 
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the assumption that individuals form their opinion about European Union membership 
relying on their personal preferences and changes they will go through on individual 
level. However, the argument that Turkish public opinion is formed through political 
cueing does not only hold the assumption of direct individual level preferences, and 
suggests that average citizen does not form specific individual opinions about European 
Union membership regardless of their policy makers’ vision, while policy makers form 
their policies strategically in the direction of their interest by paying attention to correct 
political maneuvering in order not to lose electoral support. 
In the Turkish case between the years 2005-2014, the years under the rule of AKP 
government presents great dedication of the electorate to the party, which also might be 
available for other examples of parties in Turkey, but this characteristic of Turkish 
partisan sections being inclined to shape individual preferences according to the 
supported party’s policy preferences is clear. The reason for such dedication and 
opinion formation would completely be focus of further research. However, it can be 
argued for Turkey that the Turkish electorate has long possessed the habit of supporting 
political parties no matter what the policy choices transform into, which might be linked 
to Turkish political identity and tradition at some point. Ali Çarkoğlu on this issue 
argues that such behavior might be a consequence of the fact that an average citizen 
would not be capable of shaping his/her preferences according to state level decisions, 
but according to their daily life preferences(Çarkoğlu, 2003). In other words, the 
technical and complicated details of EU membership process exceed the capacity of an 
average citizen to form an opinion about on his/her preferences on any respective issue. 
At this point, the average citizen must be made aware and conscious of the 
consequences to be reflected on and affect his/her daily life in terms of social, economic 
and cultural means in order to create an individual stance against the possible policy 
choices followed by the government. 
The argument of political cueing in Turkey constitutes the most important determinant 
of public opinion, since the general anticipation would be that an average citizen of 
Turkey would not be capable of comprehending possible policy preferences to be made 
by the government without inducement of the decision makers. The method of this 
political cue on the other hand would vary. Çarkoğlu underlines that the complicated 
political issues regarding EU membership for instance should be simplified and then 
delivered to the public by the authorities(Çarkoğlu, 2003). This simplification and 
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deliver process is the breaking point, since within this process the information would be 
vulnerable to great manipulation.  
It is clear that Turkish political tradition paves the way for citizens to form their 
political stances depending on the political actors’ preferences of their support. 
However at this point, despite the masses that determine their preferences regarding the 
policy choices of the political elite, there also will be a proportion that would consider 
economic benefits or damages that EU membership would bring along with the 
alterations of freedom of movement for persons, further educational and occupational 
alternatives and many others in prospect.  
At this point, the fraction that is politically aware of the developments regarding 
European Union relations and membership must be taken into account, since political 
awareness may well enhance the accuracy of the preference formation. However, 
Scheve and Gabel find that the influence of the cues delivered by the political elite do 
not differ for more politically aware individuals(Gabel & Scheve, 2007) 
It must be taken into account that political cueing would not be the only tool political 
elite would make use of. Scheve and Gabel introduce ‘priming’ and ‘persuasion’ as 
other tools that political elite shape public’s attitudes with(Gabel & Scheve, 2007). 
Existing research on the effect of elite cues on the formation of public opinion touch 
upon several problems regarding the measurement of the effect. As Scheve and Gabel 
put, “Reciprocal relationship raises fundamental methodological problems in attempting 
to isolate empirically the effect of elite communication on public opinion” (Gabel & 
Scheve, 2007). The problems arising in the measurement process originate from the 
complexity of dissociation of respective variables. Endogeneity for example generates a 
great complication, since factors affecting individual opinion formation cannot be 
reliably derived neither through survey based research nor through time-series 
analyses(Gabel & Scheve, 2007).  
Methodological measurement problems arising due to the nature of the content of the 
research lead this research to simply focus on whether any effect of political elite on 
public opinion are existent or not. The fact that elite-mass linkages cannot deliver strict 
validity due to several factors affecting analysis designs require a distinctive approach. 
This research therefore will utilize Eurobarometer data on public opinion in Turkey 
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together with the statements of the political elite through mass media within the 
respective period. By this way any correlation of their timing in between will be looked 
for, in order to prove that whether correct or not, information provided by the elite do 
indeed affect public’s attitude towards policy issues, hereby towards Turkey’s full 
membership to EU.  
Possible methodological problems regarding this analysis will be set aside through 
making use of previous findings of empirical results. The first will be the finding of 
Scheve and Gabel that the effect of elite messages does not vary for more politically 
aware individuals(Gabel & Scheve, 2007). This finding will let the research refer to the 
public as a mono-block and follow with the assumption that the information provided 
through the statements of the political elite would carry the same weight to each 
individual.  
Focusing on the designing process of opinion through elite messages requires attention 
to literature on preference formation. James Druckman and Arthur Lupia review 
preference formation focusing on its principles. The argument they offer is that 
preferences emerge from interactions between individuals and their environment rather 
than suddenly appearing (Druckman & Lupia, 2000). They follow with “Preferences 
over classes of objects are rankings that are derived from evaluations, where evaluations 
depend on beliefs, and beliefs are the result of interactions between individuals and their 
surroundings”(Druckman & Lupia, 2000). 
When leaning on preference formation deeply, the internal process is of course of great 
importance, since any argument on external effects that would shape individual opinion 
would require attention on the nature and origins of preferences. Druckman and Lupia 
touch upon different models regarding processes of converting information derived 
from respective environment, and intend to analyze the internal process in which 
individuals evaluate political objects within that environment.  
The memory-based model is of great interest among social scientists and assumes that 
individuals base their opinions on information retrieved from their memory. For overall 
evaluation, the individual recalls all relevant information on the topic and shapes 
preferences by making use of the new information along with the already existent 
information in his/her memory(Druckman & Lupia, 2000).  
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Another model that is applied to preference formation is the accessibility model. The 
accessibility model suggests that individuals base their preferences on whichever 
considerations happen to be accessible. Scheve and Gabel exemplifies this model as   
“For example, if an individual recently overheard a discussion about economic issues, 
the economic considerations may come to the top of the individual’s head, and as a 
result, her expressed preference will be based largely on considerations of economic 
issues”(Gabel & Scheve, 2007). The linkage with this model to our argument is of high 
importance. This model emphasizes the importance of the recently heard information on 
any policy issue that helps individuals to shape their opinions accordingly. Regarding 
EU membership of Turkey, individuals again here would shape their opinions according 
to the messages they have recently heard from certain institutions and political elite.  
Similar but at the same time contrasting the accessibility model, on-line model suggest 
that individuals update their evaluation when they encounter new information and 
therefore it stresses that individuals may well tell their opinions on any subject but may 
not be able to recall information they base their opinion on. Scheve and Gabel 
summarizes this as “If people form their evaluations on-line, then researchers should 
not expect people to remember and report the reasons for their preferences.” (Scheve, 
Gabel) Therefore it would be fair to await individuals to form their opinions about EU 
membership of Turkey according to their already existent impressions on EU, on the 
political party’s preferences they are attached to or on the political elite.  
Both exogenous and endogenous factors that are influential in public opinion formation 
may well be interconnected. National economic considerations as well as elite cues in 
regards to their influence to public are connected to Turkish public trust in the national 
government and the national parliament. In other words, the tendency of Turkish public 
to trust in the Turkish government and the parliament I claim to be influential in the 
process of public opinion formation on EU membership as well.  
Proposition 3: Turkish public support to EU membership increases, when there is an 
increase in the tendency to trust the national government 
This proposition can be approached in a double folded manner. The first would be the 
effect of tendency to trust in the government institutions in terms of public’s evaluation 
on the reliability of the political cues they provide. However, I suggest that Turkish 
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public does have the tendency to evaluate ‘the government’ and the policies they 
conduct apart from the individual political actors. In other words, although overall trust 
in the government decreases among Turkish public, political messages delivered by 
individual political elites continue to matter for the citizens at a respectable manner.  
On the other hand, this trend can be approached as that Turkish public losing trust in the 
national government affects Turkish public support in the EU membership in a negative 
manner, since losing trust in the government may well arise with an overall mistrust to 
the political environment as a whole, including the accession process to the EU. If 
individuals were to view national politics to be unstable, their tendency to trust the 
national government along with their support to the supportive policies carried out 
regarding the EU membership will show a decline.  
For the Turkish case, the period that has started with the promising picture AKP has 
painted from the beginning of their election campaigns resulted in repetitive failure in 
the accession to the EU. Although great steps were taken regarding necessary reforms to 
be carried out, the stance of EU officials as well as the gradually becoming intolerant 
declarations of Turkish officials created an environment, which can be regarded as other 
factors affecting Turkish trust in the national government and support for EU 
membership in a negative manner. In other words, decreased trust in the national 
government will affect public support for EU membership in a negative manner, but this 
trend might carry additional alternative variables affecting the results as well. The 
correlation between Turkish support to EU membership and public’s tendency to trust 
to national government will be searched through the Eurobarometer results of public 
opinion surveys on the following chapters.  
The tendency to trust in the national government and the national parliament may well 
be seen as highly correlated. However the representation system on the basis carries the 
objective to ‘represent’ the public on the political sphere, and exert influence on the 
policy choices in regards to promoting public interest. The conjunction of EU 
membership process has promoted for a very long time the idea that this process must 
be carried out on the elite level, which disregards the importance of public opinion. 
Therefore it would be fair to expect individuals to perceive the national parliament to be 
ineffective in terms of promoting public preferences on the political sphere. This trend 
however may still be affective in the process of opinion formation of the public with 
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regards to the perception of individuals to correlate the national government and the 
national parliament with regards to their political stances. This perception has its 
background in the Turkish representation system with the great representation rate AKP 
has in the parliament.  
Proposition 4: Turkish public support to EU membership increases, when there is an 
increase in the tendency to trust the national parliament 
I expect this proposition to show correlation with the statistical data, however as I have 
mentioned before, since there may have other variables affecting public support to EU 
that are now unknown to us, the analysis of different years may present contrary trends 
as well.  
The propositions I have mentioned in this chapter are to be analyzed in the following 
chapters with the statistical data visualized through graphs and tables carrying the 
numerical and percentile rates of variables. In order to grasp the attitude of the political 
elite and their discourses, statements and declarations of Turkish political elite has been 
selected and presented for the respective years. Through this approach, I expect that 
trends regarding economic considerations, political cues and tendency to trust in the 
national government and the parliament will help us to conclude on the respective 
propositions I have brought forward.  
The next chapter will follow with the historical background of the EU membership 
process Turkey has been going through for many years. With regards to Turkish public 
opinion, the historical developments are of critical importance; since Turkish public 
opinion against EU has been developed through years in accordance with the 
developments emerged in between EU and Turkey. 
 22 
 
CHAPTER 2. 
 
 
HISTORICAL BACKROUND OF TURKEY-EU RELATIONS AND AKP’S EU 
AGENDA 
 
2.1. TURKEY-EU RELATIONS IN A HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
Turkey applied for full membership to the European Economic Community of the time 
as early as 1959. At that period, and even after the signing of the Additional Protocol in 
1971, many state officials and business interest groups did have reservations against 
rapid integration to the then EEC, since they believed that such integration would 
damage national industry and economy(Yaka, 2016). However, in 1980s, as Özge Yaka 
introduces as a specific historical conjuncture, “the neo-liberal transformation of 1980s 
[…] led to a dramatic shift of opinion regarding EU membership. Turkey’s application 
for EU membership in 1987 should be evaluated within this specific historical 
conjuncture(Yaka, 2016). The application of Turkey in 1987 was rejected in 1989 due 
to specific reasons, and Turkey could only show limited progress during 1990s, except 
Turkey’s 1995 Customs Union agreement with the EU. This limited progress was 
basically due to Turkey’s problems in functioning of democracy and obvious gaps in 
the areas regarding human rights.  
At the Luxemburg Summit in December 1997, the decision was made to exclude 
Turkey from the prospective members list. This disappointing decision made by the EU 
however did not break hopes of Turkey, and efforts continued to normalize the relations 
in between.  
1999 and onwards witnessed highly important steps regarding Turkey’s EU 
harmonization reforms under the tripartite coalition of DSP (Demokratik Sol Parti- 
Democratic Left Party), the centre-right ANAP (Anavatan Partisi- Motherland Party) 
and the nationalist MHP (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi- Nationalist Movement Party). This 
period under the tripartite coalition government did involve steps regarding EU 
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membership, however the stance of the government did not obviously paint a very 
enthusiastic picture regarding this project(Öniş & Yılmaz, 2009). Although the centre-
right ANAP showed interest in further reforms in this manner, DSP and MHP’s 
nationalist outlook was not ready for further reforms for compliance with the 
Copenhagen Criteria that are pointing on Turkey’s highly sensitive issues such as 
abolition of death penalty and legislation regarding the public use of Kurdish and other 
minority languages. However, reform packages including these legislations have been 
initiated in 2001 and 2002.  
 
These efforts gained speed with the ceasefire declared by the PKK (Kurdistan Workers 
Party) and at last in 1999 Turkey was recognized as a candidate country at the Helsinki 
Summit in December 1999. The recognition of Turkey as a candidate indeed accelerated 
necessary social and political transformation in Turkish society(Yaka, 2016). Özge 
Yaka refers to this process as ‘the EU membership project’ and defines this period so; 
“In the first few years of the 2000s, the project became the central theme of Turkish 
social and political life as the consensus on the EU membership issue had effectively 
defined ‘the centre ground of politics’ and the mainstream political arena began to 
construct itself around this goal”(Yaka, 2016). 
The reform process concerning compliance with the Copenhagen Criteria has been 
brought to another level with AKP (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi) came to power with the 
2002 elections. This phase witnessed great expectations of public regarding necessary 
policy changes especially in terms of economic policies. The economic recession that 
have been going on for several years and reached its peak at 2001 created a highly 
pessimistic environment where economic and financial rates showed great negative 
image. This economic crisis of 2001 posed severe effects on the public, and the reforms 
regarding EU compliance especially in terms of economic orientations became more 
attractive. AKP have already signaled its intention, starting with the period of election 
campaigns, to carry out significant steps regarding EU membership and to have this 
issue on the top of its priorities. The period after the economic crisis required several 
regulations and the first years of 2000s witnessed Turkish economy in need of EU 
anchor strictly. Indeed, the period after AKP came to power witnessed great 
Europeanization efforts regarding Turkey’s foreign and domestic policy, in addition to 
regulations in economic policies as well.  
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Turkey showed remarkable effort in terms of harmonization process to the EU during 
the first half of 2000s, with the beginning of the accession negotiations in 2005 -when 
most people considered as the turning point of the EU project of Turkey- the public 
support showed a respectable decline in terms of enthusiasm to the prospective full 
membership. At this juncture, the general election of 2002 and the phase Justice and 
Development Party became the ruling party requires special attention, since these 
developments indeed have great impact regarding Turkey’s EU membership project 
(Ahtisaari & Rohan, 2005).  
General election period of 2002 witnessed the AKP’s election campaigns strictly in 
favor of EU. When AKP took office, AKP’s pro-EU attitude continued by taking great 
pace, while reforms regarding EU harmonization in order to meet the Copenhagen 
criteria have been focus of great attention. Considering Turkish foreign policy during 
AKP era, all might well agree that AKP showed great interest in EU during the general 
election campaigns. After taking the office, the reform process they carried gained great 
pace in order to meet the Copenhagen criteria. This process might be approached so that 
AKP government with its image with great enthusiasm in generating a fully democratic 
environment has taken great advantage of the EU harmonization process and its 
necessities. AKP’s demeanor towards EU is visible within its party program:  
“Taking as a basis the principles pertaining to democratization of the Copenhagen 
Criteria, which constitute the minimum standards to which members of the 
European Union must conform, amendments, which must be made in our national 
judicial system shall be carried out in the shortest possible time”. (AKP Party 
Program, 2011) 
 
As introduced by scholars as ‘the golden years’ of Europeanization of Turkish foreign 
policy, the period from 2002 until the beginning of accession negotiations of 2005 
witnessed several developments regarding necessary reforms. These reforms were 
successfully conducted under the rule of AKP government. Öniş and Yılmaz touches 
upon these developments by grouping into three areas. The first would be the successful 
economic growth Turkish economy experienced(Öniş & Yılmaz, 2009). Necessary EU 
reforms along with the requirements of IMF contributed significantly to Turkish 
economy by revitalizing monetary and fiscal discipline that enhanced Turkey’s 
regulatory implementations and finally called forth significant economic development. 
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The required reforms conducted by the AKP government attracted significant amount of 
FDI.  
The second area Öniş and Yılmaz touch upon is efforts on democratic 
consolidation(Öniş & Yılmaz, 2009). AKP government carried out great reforms in 
order to eliminate the accustomed ordinance earlier governments yielded. Elimination 
of the death penalty constitutes a great example of such reforms. This reform and many 
others call forth that elimination of several measures indeed required only 
administrative regulations, since many legal codes were defunct in practice. Kurdish 
problem and the measures taken to eliminate these problems take a totally novel shape 
within AKP’s policy decisions. A series of democratic openings were conducted in 
order to exert cultural and language rights to Turkish citizens of Kurdish origin, 
although it attracted serious reaction from certain fractions.  
The first three years of AKP rule witnessed passing of 8 EU ‘harmonization legislation 
packages’ along with changes in the Constitution and other regulations. This great pace 
of carrying out reform packages paved the way for European Commission to note 
Turkey as it sufficiently met the Copenhagen Criteria. European Commission 
recognizing this performance regarding compliance of Copenhagen Criteria brought 
forth the decision to open accession negotiations with Turkey. 
Although the long awaited steps were taken, some external factors caused this decline. 
The Cyprus Referendum of April 2004 was the breaking point within these external 
factors. This referendum caused a significant shift in Turkish public opinion on EU 
membership towards negative.  
Turkey’s relations with Cyprus have been of critical importance concerning Turkey-EU 
relations without any doubt. While relations between two countries affected Turkey’s 
position towards EU, membership of the Cyprus Republic carried the existing deadlock 
to a whole new level. Since respective developments carry great effect in regards to 
Turkey’s EU membership project, it is essential to touch upon this context.  
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2.2. RELATIONS WITH CYPRUS 
After Turkish occupation of the third of the island in 1974, Turkey refused to recognize 
the Republic of Cyprus, while declaring and recognizing Turkish Republic of Northern 
Cyprus in 1983. Turkish occupation of 1974 resulted in movement of refugees on both 
sides of the Green Line. This incident along with the formation of the self-declared 
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus constitutes the core of the Cyprus dispute.  
AKP government’s efforts on Europeanization process in the first half of 2000s came 
along with certain changes in the domestic and foreign policies, including the policies 
on the Cyprus dispute. Cyprus problem has become one of the most controversial topics 
that was exposed to great policy change which consequently created criticisms 
regarding both domestic and foreign policy choices. AKP government implemented 
critical changes in the policy stance on Cyprus. Turkey has been conducting an official 
policy on Cyprus since 1974, and AKP implementing drastic changes in this respective 
policy has been criticized especially by the nationalist fraction of Turkey and Turkish 
Cypriot Community. The underlying significance of the criticisms was AKP 
compromising and threatening national interests.  
The change of AKP’s policy towards Cyprus came along with unconditional support to 
nationalist leader of the Turkish Cypriots of Northern Cyprus being lifted. The loss of 
support eventually caused Rauf Denktaş to lose the presidential elections to Mehmet Ali 
Talat along with its parliamentary majority. Mehmet Ali Talat’s stance on the Cyprus 
problem was in compliance with the AKP government, and together the governments 
promoted Kofi Annan’s plan regarding the solution of the long existing problem. Both 
governments acted in accordance, for the sake of the Annan Plan the Turkish Cypriot 
population was mobilized in accordance to say yes to the plan in the referendum of 
April 2004(Yaka, 2016). 
Annan Plan for Cyprus constituted the peak of the dispute. Turkey and Turkish Cypriots 
sided with the plan in 2004 that aimed to reunify the island. However, the plan was 
rejected by the Greek Cypriot party and they claimed that the plan did not match their 
expectations, since they claim that the plan introduced rights of residence for Anatolian 
Turks who moved to Cyprus after the invasion, while Greek Cypriots who lost their 
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property after the invasion were to be granted only with restricted rights of 
residence(Ahtisaari & Rohan, 2005).  
The EU prior to the proposal of the plan encouraged Turkey to support it, and much 
criticism was procured regarding the outcome. However, the Republic of Cyprus 
became a full member of the EU right after the failure of the respective plan. 
Consequently, Turkish government did not recognize the Republic of Cyprus while 
stating that it will not be recognized until blockades on the Turkish Republic of 
Northern Cyprus of the political and economic terms are removed. This non-recognition 
of the Republic of Cyprus created obstacles for Turkey’s accession negotiations, since 
EU openly stated that in order to continue accession negotiations, the candidate country 
has to recognize every member state of the EU. Furthermore, in compliance with the 
Customs Union Agreement Turkey already signed, Turkey has to open its airports and 
ports to Greek aircrafts and vessels. Turkey in return required EU to ease the isolation 
of the Northern Cyprus on international level. This dispute finally caused EU’s freezing 
of eight chapters in Turkey’s accession negotiations.  
The Cyprus question perceived by the Turkish side as to be discarded with the support 
of Turkey to the Annan Plan prior to the referendum, as it was signaled so by the EU. 
However, the developments did not match the expectations. Turkish public reacted to 
the EU membership of the Cyprus Republic as a matter of course, since contrary to the 
expectations, although Greek Cypriots did not compromise, they were awarded by the 
EU membership. The European Commission did put in effort in order to lift the 
isolation of Northern Cyprus by offering allowance of direct trade, which was vetoed by 
the Cyprus Republic as well.  
The Additional Protocol that was to be signed by Turkey to recognize the 10 new 
member states of the EU was signed in December 2004. The signing of the Additional 
Protocol was important for the launch of accession negotiations of Turkey to the EU. 
However just 7 months after the signing of the protocol, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan stated 
that Turkey’s signature does not constitute the recognition of the Cyprus Republic(Öniş 
& Yılmaz, 2009).Then after a few months, the EU made it clear that the recognition of 
all EU member states is a must in order to carry out the accession process and required 
Turkey to implement the agreement ‘fully and non-discriminatorily’.  
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Turkey’s ongoing dispute with Cyprus created many setbacks in the EU agenda of 
Turkey. These setbacks did not only appear as Cyprus Republic being an official 
member of the EU vetoing opening of chapters regarding Turkish negotiations, but the 
image of EU in terms of trustworthiness lost its previous appeal. EU carrying out 
accession negotiations with Turkey did not only disappoint Turkey with its stance in the 
Cyprus dispute(Öniş & Yılmaz, 2009). Statements and behavior of several EU officials 
regarding Turkish accession, vetoing of several chapters, proposal of privileged 
membership along with other safeguard measures proposed to be implemented in case 
of Turkish membership created an atmosphere where Turkish accession stands in deep 
ambiguity.  
2.3. GRADUAL DISENGAGEMENT AND PURSUIT OF NEW 
ALTERNATIVES 
The institutional framework of the EU in particular posed several obstacles for Turkey’s 
route of accession. Although Turkey has met the expectations in a satisfactory level, the 
process of accession has been obstructed by different means. The setup that gives each 
member state veto power along with the ‘indivisible’ nature of the acquis communitaire, 
gives each member state of EU the competency to hold up negotiations either with a 
particular negotiating party or to stymie the overall enlargement prospects of the 
EU(Avcı, 2011). 
In particular to Turkish case, the obstacle was the suspension and vetoing of several 
chapters by member states; France, Germany, Greece and Greek Cyprus Republic have 
blocked numerous chapters.  Only 15 out of 35 Chapters have been opened since the 
beginning of the accession negotiations, while the EU has frozen eight chapters. The 
reason for EU to freeze these chapters was Turkey’s refusal to open its airports and 
ports to Greek aircrafts and vessels.  
As it was discussed above, the first half of the 2000s witnessed a great period of 
Europeanization with regard to EU harmonization process and aim of Turkey to meet 
necessary criteria to become a full member of the union. The scenery in the second half 
of the 2000s however was obviously different. In October 2005, when accession 
negotiations finally started, the idea of full membership to the EU has already lost its 
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appeal. It was clearly stated by the EU that the launch of negotiations does not ensure 
full membership of Turkey unless many conditions are met along with estimations of 
EU’s ‘absorption capacity’ and votes of European nationals(Yaka, 2016). Scholars 
introduce this phase as first signs of ‘weak commitment’, as the EU Council within the 
Negotiation Framework included that negotiations with Turkey will be open-ended, in 
other words full membership of Turkey will not be ensured at the end of the 
process(Yaka, 2016). Austria and Germany in particular proposed that Turkey’s 
accession process to withhold the possibility of privileged partnership rather than full 
membership. France and Austria on the other hand declared that they would hold 
national referenda on Turkish membership. Disregarding that these referenda did not 
take place due to several reasons concerning national legislative framework, these 
proposals made clear that these countries do hold serious reservations regarding 
Turkey’s membership to the union, which created discomfort among the Turkish public 
and political environment.  
As a reaction to these developments of negotiations being blocked, Turkish public lost 
its enthusiasm towards EU membership project, while the issue was slightly digressing 
from the political agenda.  
The obvious loss of enthusiasm for EU membership in Turkey on the public front of 
course needs an explanation. As Öniş and Yılmaz argue, this process of decreased 
enthusiasm towards EU membership does not build on a single turning point, but on 
correlation on several turning points and factors(Öniş & Yılmaz, 2009). This change of 
mood can be observed within the public as well as on the part of AKP elite.  
The change of mood can be related with both external and internal factors. Regarding 
external factors, the dynamics within the EU along with EU member states’ stances 
towards prospect of Turkish membership do indeed affect Turkish public support to the 
project. The atmosphere reflected to Turkey after Brussels Summit, has been mentioned 
by Öniş and Yılmaz: 
“The intense debate generated in core EU countries such as France and Germany in 
the aftermath of the critical Brussels Summit has helped to create a serious 
nationalistic backlash in Turkey and strengthened the bonds of anti-EU, anti-
reform groups both within the state and the society at large”(Öniş & Yılmaz, 2009) 
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EU’s stance against issues that are of critical importance in regards to Turkish accession 
also created great negative influence both within elite and public levels. The first and 
prominent problem was the precautionary clause EU proposed to take against allowance 
of full labor mobility in case of Turkey’s full membership. This proposal of EU created 
vast amount of criticism within Turkey while being evaluated as a discriminatory 
measure that signals unfair treatment, since other Eastern European members were to 
implement a temporary safeguard on the issue.  This discriminatory proposal as a matter 
of course resonated the privileged membership offer.  
In December 2009, The Cyprus Republic blocked 6 chapters of accession; Judiciary and 
Fundamental Rights, Energy and Education and Culture. The purpose underneath was 
made public, as Turkey has to initially ‘normalize’ relations with Cyprus in order to 
continue negotiations in a sound manner. Hence, since June 2010, no chapters were 
opened and as all other chapters were blocked, the most complicated and economically 
depredatory chapters were left to Turkey to open. 
Consequently, after these developments, it would be fair to mention that the AKP 
government also lost its devotion to the EU membership project. This loss of devotion 
became evident after 2007 general elections. The policy stance of AKP government on 
some terms is challenged by the internal dynamics of EU. In other words, AKP started 
to conceive the fact that its ideological roots of religious base will not be reciprocated. 
Due to several factors including these, AKP government after 2007 did not show the 
same effort to continue to implement necessary reforms.  In fact, as Öniş and Yılmaz 
suggest, AKP government did miss a great opportunity during the fall of 2007(Öniş & 
Yılmaz, 2009). The reasons why AKP’s policies shifted away were that AKP perceived 
its own power at an exaggerated level and their perception of EU as an important 
partner changed drastically. The perception of AKP after 2007 general elections was 
due to the electoral support they gained with a larger coalition. Hence, AKP did not take 
its chance to regenerate and update the reform agenda they have been carrying out for 
several years back then.  
AKP’s foreign policy style already carried a significant initiative of ‘zero problems’ 
with neighbors. This approach has become highly significant in the Cyprus dispute with 
AKP government’s great compromise in resolving the long existing dispute. Moreover, 
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AKP displayed great progress in Turkey’s relations with Georgia, especially with the 
growth of Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway project initiative.   
Especially after 2009, AKP government made it clear that they now will evaluate 
alternative partners of cooperation. The AKP government’s foreign policy formation 
actually gave clues in this regard. Collaborations being done with Middle Eastern, 
African and Arab countries in particular created a platform for Turkey to continue its 
path with alternative policy preferences.  
‘Strategic depth’ perspective of Ahmet Davutoğlu carries the multi-dimensional foreign 
policy to another level. As Öniş and Yılmaz state: 
“Davutoğlu argues that in order to formulate long-lasting strategic perspective, one 
needs to take into account ‘historical depth’ which provides a sound assessment of 
the links between the past, present and the future, as well as a ‘geographical depth’ 
penetrating into the intricate dynamics of the relations between domestic, regional 
and global factors” (Öniş & Yılmaz, 2009) 
This approach of Davutoğlu underlines Turkey’s multiple regional identities that are to 
be extended in terms of its influence in Europe, Middle East, Balkans, The Black Sea, 
Caucasus, Central Asia, The Caspian and the Mediterranean(Öniş & Yılmaz, 2009), and 
thereby become a key player in the region.   
Turkey’s prospects carried out in accordance with this foreign policy approach pushed 
Turkey for further progress in relations with the Middle Eastern and Eurasian countries. 
Turkish participation in the Organization of the Islamic Conference has been regarded 
as an attempt to further develop relations with the Arab world with the previous 
developments regarded as rapprochement between the parties as well. When relations 
with Russia is concerned, it can be argued that Turkey has been becoming more 
important transit country and energy hub, which develops competition with Russia. 
Regarding diplomatic and economic relations, Turkey pursues developmental policies 
not only with Russia, but also with former USSR countries. 
Turkey’s role as a regional and global actor became more prominent under the AKP 
governance. AKP promoted Turkish role as a global power by emphasizing its 
intercultural nature and participating initiatives for fighting against terrorism in 
particular. AKP in this respect has participated the Alliance of Civilizations Initiative 
raised by Spanish Prime Minister Zapatero in order to create alternative approaches 
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against international terrorism. Turkey did not only participate in the initiative, but also 
agreed to co-sponsor the project, and finally became a leader and “a more vocal 
advocate of the project than even Spain(Öniş & Yılmaz, 2009) 
When relations of Turkey with the United States are considered, it can be said that the 
2000s did not paint a very promising picture. Despite several clashes in terms of 
favored policy choices, there has been also converging interests which on the other hand 
signifies the importance of peace and stability in Iraq and the Middle East, enlargement 
of NATO, collaborative fight against terrorism and much others. 
After July 2007 elections, AKP came to power once again with a larger coalition of 
support. This outcome has created AKP the chance to revive the reform agenda of EU 
project, since the level of public support they achieved would have enabled them to 
conduct necessary reforms. However, AKP did not choose to revive the reform agenda, 
which is a consequence of the loss of enthusiasm against the EU membership project. 
AKP rather focused on several domestic policies that are related to religious freedoms, 
however without incorporating these to a more extensive reform agenda that could have 
involve necessary reforms for further EU harmonization. 
The aftermath of these domestic reforms based on fundamental religious rights 
witnessed serious reservations within the society, and even within the fraction that have 
been highly supportive of AKP’s reformist approach. This has been followed by the 
Constitutional Court case regarding closure of the AKP for violating the secular 
constitutional order of the state. Without much surprise, Turkey-EU relations have been 
affected accordingly, since the raised questions about Turkey’s democratic basis played 
into the hands of the European society, which cannot be argued to develop highly 
enthusiastic stance towards Turkey at all. The decision of the Constitutional Court was 
of crucial importance not only for AKP and Turkish political system, but also for the 
future of Turkish relations with the EU, since negotiations could have been suspended 
in such case.  
After a stagnation of the negotiation process without any chapter openings for 2 years, 
European Commission decided to launch a ‘Positive agenda’ aiming to focus on the 
common interests on both parties. The agenda including a broad range of elements was 
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carrying the aim to support the negotiation process, and therefore, working groups 
regarding necessary chapters have been established.   
The Gezi Parkı protests and its aftermath regarding the criticisms the government has 
received changed the dynamics of the negotiation process. Germany blocked the start of 
further accession talks with Turkey, and Turkish political elite raised their tones harshly 
against the criticisms they received from the EU front due to excessive force used 
against the protesters.  
 
In respect to many developments influencing Turkish accession negotiations and 
prospective membership, it can be argued that while the EU front had demonstrated 
great reservations in many terms, Turkish enthusiasm has gradually decreased as well. It 
is observable that with the loss of enthusiasm in regards to EU membership project, 
Turkey started to develop new alternatives with its developing strategic perspective of 
becoming a regional and global actor. The process of accession negotiations 
accompanied with many stumbling blocks from both sides of course did have influence 
to the EU membership project. In the next chapter, the trends of public support towards 
EU membership along with other determinants proposed to affect the public opinion 
formation are to be researched, while the historical elements that have influenced the 
policy formation taken into consideration.  
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CHAPTER 3.  
 
 
DATA ANALYSIS 
 
Data regarding Turkish public’s opinion on EU related issues has been retrieved from 
Eurobarometer surveys conducted twice a year by the European Union. In compliance 
with the given propositions, 4 of the Eurobarometer survey questions directed to 
Turkish respondents have been selected for analysis. Besides, data visualizing the 
growth rate of Turkish economy from 2005 to 2014 has been retrieved.  Although 
Eurobarometer surveys include Turkey since 2001 regarding public opinion surveys, 
our focus will be the survey questions covering the information between the years 2005 
and 2014. 
The first question analyses the view of Turkish public on Turkey’s possible membership 
of the EU through the question of “Generally speaking, do you think that Turkey's 
membership of the European Union would be...?”. The responses are grouped as “a 
good thing”, “a bad thing”, “neither good or bad” and “do not know”. 
The second survey question refers to the image of the European Union as a whole in the 
eyes of Turkish public through “In general, does the European Union conjure up for you 
a very positive, fairly positive, neutral, fairly negative or very negative image?”.  
The third and fourth survey-questions are chosen intended to set forth trust Turkish 
public have in the Turkish government and the Turkish parliament. The reason why 
these questions occur relevant is that the trust Turkish public has in these institutions 
can be related to public support for EU membership on an individual basis. In other 
words, trust in these institutions Turkish people have might present correlative increase 
or decrease with the extent they shape their attitudes towards EU membership, and the 
stances they pose government officials’ and parliament members’ discourses. These 
questions were delivered as “I would like to ask you a question about how much trust 
you have in certain institutions. For each of the following institutions, please tell me if 
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you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it; The Turkish Government/ The Turkish 
Parliament”.  
The survey questions selected from Eurobarometer surveys carry the aim to search for 
several aspects regarding Turkish public opinion and its formation.  The data regarding 
Turkish public support for EU membership, Turkish public’s views on the image of EU, 
growth rates of Turkish economy and tendency to trust in the Turkish government and 
the parliament are to be analyzed with the aim for to find respectable coherence with the 
given propositions.  
I expect that trust on certain national institutions might well shape the effect of the cues 
delivered by the officials belonging to these institutions. In other words, I claim that if 
people tend to trust their institutions and officials, it would be more probable that they 
will be affected by the discourses they provide to the public. However, the trends that 
would not follow this claim must be acknowledged as well, with the approach that trust 
people have in certain institutions do not necessarily mean that the information provided 
by them would not create any response in the minds of individuals.  
The decline in the tendency to trust in the national government can be analyzed as an 
overall mistrust to the political environment as well, that would also include the 
relations with the EU. In other words, it would not necessarily mean that the lack of 
trust in national government or the parliament would directly be correlated with 
individuals support for the policies the parliament proposes and the governments 
pursue.  
At last, it must be made clear that government officials may have to act in accordance 
with these trends and apply necessary strategic maneuvers in terms of political and 
social choices that are of critical importance for the public opinion. Therefore, the 
statements of political elite may come into prominence for political support. Hence, the 
cues that are provided to the public may become more critical and necessitate greater 
strategic formation.  
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3.1. GROWTH RATE OF TURKISH ECONOMY 
 
Figure 1– Growth Rate of Turkish Economy (2005-2014) 
 
Proposition 1 I have stated on the theoretical framework chapter claims that Turkish 
public support for EU membership declines when there is a positive growth in the 
Turkish economy. In the first place, it must be clear that the crisis environment of 2001 
created the image of the tripartite coalition government failing to implement successful 
policies that would pull Turkey through the crisis with minimum damage. Although the 
coalition government took several steps regarding EU compliance, it was clear that EU 
membership prospect was not among the priorities of the government. Turkish public 
however, was aware that Turkey turning its face to West, especially to EU might create 
certain opportunities especially in regards to economic means(Kutlay, 2011). In other 
words, with the failure of the coalition government to recover out of the crisis on its 
own means, Turkish public started to view EU membership process and respective 
necessary reforms as a way out. Therefore, EU membership prospect promising 
economic growth started to be a highly important alternative for Turkey. Although this 
period does not fall into our focus primarily, it is important to underline this correlation 
in terms of utility-based factors affecting Turkish public opinion regarding EU 
membership. When Proposition 1 is embraced, this period of economic crisis followed 
by AKP taking office with the primary policy of EU membership compliance, it 
becomes visible that the downtrend of economy in 2001 eventuated with increased 
public support to EU membership of Turkey. In other words, Turkish public support to 
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EU membership increased during the 2001 economic crisis, and this was visible with 
AKP winning the 2002 general elections with great emphasis on EU membership bid. 
The first 3 years of AKP rule between 2002-2005 indeed showed remarkable economic 
recovery after the economic crisis of 2001. This period witnessed great enthusiasm by 
the government towards EU membership bid. As a matter of fact, EU membership stood 
as the primary objective of the AKP government at its first term and reforms regarding 
EU compliance have been conducted at a great pace during this period. In year 2005, 
when the accession negotiations finally began with the EU, Turkish economy painted a 
far more promising picture. 
When data regarding growth rate of Turkish economy between the years of 2005 and 
2014 is studied, it is visible that the growth rate in the post-2005 period shows a gradual 
decline and hit negative digits in the year 2009. Turkish economy in 2005 witnessed a 
growth rate of 8.4%, followed by 6.9% in 2006, 4.7% in 2007, 0.7% in 2008 and -4.7% 
in 2009. This low trend of 2009 signifies the impact of 2008 global crisis. When 
compared to other countries, scholars suggest that Turkish economy stands among the 
countries, which pulled through the global crisis with minimum economic damage. As it 
can be seen, the uptrend following 2009 until 2010 and 2011 embraces that Turkey has 
pulled its rate of economic growth up to 9.2%.  
It is clear that 2008 global crisis has affected Turkish economy in a negative manner. 
However, the fast recovery of the economy, which is visible with the rates coming up to 
9.2% in 2010 from -4.7% in 2009 regarding economic growth, can be linked with 
several factors. First of all, Turkish economic orientation in respect with Turkish 
foreign policy has experienced precise transformation in correlation with EU 
harmonization process. After the opening of accession negotiations in 2005, Turkey 
went through a transformation process in terms of its foreign policy making. Meltem 
Müftüler-Baç and Yaprak Gürsoy address this transformation as Europeanization of 
Turkish foreign policy(Müftüler-Baç & Gürsoy, 2010). In regards to adjustments to the 
EU, Turkish foreign policy started to implement civilian tools that “involve seeking 
international legitimacy, collaborating with others in the region and looking for 
solutions in multilateral settings and international or regional institutions”(Müftüler-
Baç, 2011). 
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Müftüler Baç further argues that Europeanization of Turkish foreign policy involving 
several dimensions made it to become more effective, and the implementation of new 
tools in respect to civilian means brought Turkey further prospects. Turkey not only 
gained credibility and visibility especially regarding economic means in the 
international arena, but also implemented a more active approach in respect to its 
foreign policy towards its neighbors by intentions of eliminating any kind of tension in 
between(Müftüler-Baç, 2011). The orientation of Turkish foreign policy represented 
new prospects to Turkey especially regarding relations with its neighbors in the Middle 
East, Caucasus and Central Asia. Müftüler-Baç especially touches upon the Turkish 
foreign policy changes towards Iraq, Syria and Armenia in addition to Turkey’s position 
in international institutions as precise indicators of the Europeanized Turkish foreign 
policy implementing soft power tools in policy-making and the efforts for eliminating 
sources of hostilities especially with the neighbors(Müftüler-Baç, 2011).  
The post 2005 period witnessed Turkish expansion in terms of economic tools in 
relation with its foreign policy direction. MüftülerBaç puts “[…] it became the largest 
trading partner for Azerbaijan, Georgia and Iraq as well as one of the largest investors 
in these countries [...]” (Müftüler-Baç, 2011)Turkey’s regional as well as global role has 
been enhanced in this period not only with economic orientation, but also with its 
participation to regional and global initiatives. These developments and changes in the 
foreign policy resulted in remarkable increase in Turkey’s international credibility and 
visibility in the international arena.  
When the global economic crisis of 2008 hit, Turkey had already developed alternative 
economic paths. In contrast to pre-2005 period, Turkey and Turkish economy did not 
need the EU anchor in terms of economic developments. In other words, Turkey was 
not solely depended to EU in economic relations, but developed alternative relations 
with Middle Eastern, North African and Central Asian countries at most. When 
Turkey’s export rates are examined, it is visible that Turkish export market has been 
diversified greatly(Öniş, 2012). Pre-2005 period witnessed great amount of trade with 
EU member states. Although the following period hold remarkable rates of trade with 
EU, it is highly observable that trade with Middle Eastern and North African countries 
started to occupy a respectable place in the overall picture.  
In response to the global economic crisis, the AKP government has developed certain 
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strategies regarding its foreign economic policy. Turkey’s trade balance, which has been 
changing for several years towards alternative paths of cooperation, was followed by 
the AKP government’s response, which is to continue further emphasis on South-South 
cooperation(Öniş & Güven, 2011). Within these efforts, the AKP government tried to 
promote Turkey’s strategic position as an energy hub between Asia and Europe and 
developed projects in this respect.  
Turkey’s fast recovery from the 2008 global economic crisis with remarkable economic 
growth rates is a result of Turkey’s then continuing efforts towards export market 
diversification. The intentions on diversification of export market were of critical 
importance not only for maintaining stable economic conditions, but also for putting an 
end to Turkey’s perpetuate reliance on the West, especially Europe in terms of 
economic ties in particular.  
The AKP government promoted several trade policies especially intending to attract the 
abundant Gulf capital with stressing on the common ground of Islamic ties and 
solidarity. Throughout these development, in order to promote further trade 
opportunities, with more than two dozen Middle Eastern, Asian and African countries 
visa requirements have been eased mutually along with facilitating further bilateral 
trade agreements in between(Öniş, 2012).  
The period of downturn in the capital inflows and demand for Turkish exports in the 
Eurozone area caused negative impact on the Turkish economy. However, the 
regulatory reforms that were carried out in the period before the global crisis made it 
possible for the Turkish economy to become robust against the deprecating global 
economic environment.  AKP’s economic policies with regards to the relations with the 
IMF also are significant during this period. The AKP government took a stance that 
would emphasis Turkey and Turkish economy does not need IMF anymore. In line with 
this stance, AKP government’s decision not to sign an agreement with the IMF once 
again signaled the national strength and self-confidence of the government. As Öniş 
implies, this growing self-confidence of the AKP government that has been signaled by 
the loosened relationship with the IMF continued with shifts in the power relations in 
Turkish domestic political economy(Öniş, 2012). Öniş puts as “The AKP, with its much 
stronger position at the center of the Turkish political system, could choose to act quite 
independently from the demands of major conglomerates represented under the 
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umbrella of TÜSİAD”(Öniş, 2012). Accordingly, the AKP government chose to act in 
respect to its core constituency’s demands. The core constituency constitute especially 
of the rising Anatolian business elites that are mainly represented by Independent 
Industrialists and Businessmen’s Association (MÜSİAD).  Regarding the power shifts 
in the domestic political economy, AKP government unlike its early years presented a 
much more critical stance both against the IMF programs and EU membership. The 
2008 global crisis period and its aftermath witnessed TÜSİAD’s continued commitment 
both to IMF programs and EU membership prospect, while AKP was observed to 
diverge from TÜSİAD on both grounds(Öniş, 2012).  
AKP’s crisis management strategy was mostly established on the export market 
diversifying strategy and although it has been criticized on certain dimensions, it can be 
observed that the crisis has been avoid to a certain extent. The rates signifying a fast 
recovery after the global crisis proves AKP’s strategy of export market diversifying to 
be successful in terms of economic crisis management.  However, Turkey’s diversified 
export market in the following years have brought along certain complicacies. Turkey’s 
export market, which has extended especially towards Middle Eastern and North 
African countries hold the fact that the countries in the region lack political and social 
stability.  
In line with this fact, the end of 2010 the Arab Spring broke out, and the effects of the 
Arab Spring exceeded Middle East and Northern Africa (MENA), who experienced the 
uprisings in the first hand. Countries who possess strong economic, cultural and 
political ties with Arabic states also suffered immensely as a result of this unstable 
environment. The export and import goods, as well as the touristic activities with 
Turkey diminished adversely due to either raising prices or the fear of mobility between 
corresponding states(Öncel & Malik, 2015). An example could be increasing oil prices 
towards the beginning of the Arab Spring, which resulted in decreased economic 
activities with other oil importing countries.  
 
Turkey, which has sought new markets in its vicinity due to economic crisis in 
European Union in year 2008 was one of the victims of this indirect causality. The most 
apparent negative trend in international economic activities of Turkey is in the Libya 
and Syria cases. For instance, even though the export share of Turkey in Libya was 
considerably low until 2008, new market research successfully raised this index to 
0.0176 in 2009(Öncel & Malik, 2015). However, the sudden events of the Arab Spring 
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in 2011 hindered export activities and resulted to a point of 0.0055 in respective share. 
In terms of the Syria, the export share of Turkey increased more than two folds between 
2006 and 2010 to 0.0162 but the Arab Spring affected this index to fall drastically to 
0.003 in 2012(Öncel & Malik, 2015).Following these developments, without much 
surprise, Turkish economy once again started to witness a sharp decline of growth rate; 
falling down from 9.2% in 2010 to 8.8% in 2011, and then to 2.2% in 2013 and finally 
to 2.9% in 2014.  
 
Although the period after 2010 sees a gradual decline, the fast recovery of Turkish 
economy from 2008 global crisis I claim to build up an environment of trust in the 
national economy. When data on Turkish economic growth rate and support for EU 
membership are taken into account together, a positive correlation seems to exist. In 
other words, the data signifies that when Turkish economy progresses in a positive 
trend, the trend of support for EU membership tends to show a decline.  
This correlation can be explained with above-mentioned economic incentives the AKP 
government took, especially after the year 2005. As explained, the post-2005 period 
witnessed AKP government and public lost its enthusiasm in the EU project and the 
government developed its economic incentives alternative to Western partners. 
According to data retrieved by Turkish Statistical Institute, Yaka also touches upon the 
statistical data regarding Turkish export market diversification as, “the total share of 
exports to the Near and Middle East countries rose from 12.5% to 23.4% between 2014 
and 2013, while the share of exports to the EU countries fell from 58.1% to 41.5% in 
the same period(Yaka, 2016). Even though these percentages signify great change 
regarding Turkish economic ties with Near and Middle East countries and EU countries, 
EU still seems to remain as the most important trade partner of Turkey.  
Turkey considering new alternatives in economic relations indeed shows signs of 
changes in policy choices. The changing policy choices of course have causal relations 
with Turkey becoming less hopeful day-by-day regarding EU membership project. 
However another approach to these changes of policy choices might be explained with 
the growing self-confidence of Turkey. This self-confidence of Turkey is not only 
visible in relations with EU, but in many others especially regarding other global 
partners. Yaka refers to this self-confidence as to “have deep roots in Turkish common 
sense” and points out that the political discourses of AKP have been signaling this in 
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economic and foreign policy manners recently(Yaka, 2016). The self-confidence with 
regards to Turkish economy reflected upon the public may well affect public support for 
EU membership. As explained in the theoretical framework chapter regarding the 
respective proposition, this positive correlation between the declining public support 
and positive progress of Turkish economy sets forth that Turkish public views EU as 
means rather than ends in terms of economic considerations.  
3.2. TURKEY’S MEMBERSHIP TO THE EUROPEAN UNION 
 
Table 1 below shows the numerical distribution of the respondents to the question 
“Generally speaking, do you think that Turkey's membership of the European Union 
would be a good thing? A bad thing? Or neither a good or a bad thing?”, while 
embracing the respondents who replied to the question as ‘do not know’. Our period of 
concern covers the years between 2005-2014 and the datasets of Eurobarometer 63 to 
Eurobarometer 82 therefore have been scanned.  
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  A good 
thing 
A bad 
thing 
Neither 
good or 
bad 
Do not 
know 
Total # of 
participants 
2005-1 EB63 591 205 174 34 1004 
2005-2 EB64 556 149 211 88 1004 
2006-1 EB65 442 254 231 78 1005 
2006-2 EB66 538 217 178 72 1005 
2007-1 EB67 522 223 165 88 998 
2007-2 EB68 492 249 149 115 1005 
2008-1 EB69 493 214 172 124 1003 
2008-2 EB70 422 295 161 125 1003 
2009-1 EB71 481 263 172 89 1005 
2009-2 EB72 455 263 188 97 1003 
2010-1 EB73 467 233 170 130 1000 
2010-2 EB74 415 322 124 138 999 
2011-1 EB75 414 288 197 101 1000 
2011-2 EB76 - - - - - 
2012-1 EB77 369 346 162 123 1000 
2012-2 EB78 356 330 193 121 1000 
2013-1 EB79 378 310 209 104 1001 
2013-2 EB80 381 369 174 78 1002 
2014-1 EB81 394 339 271 22 1026 
2014-2 EB82 306 423 273 85 1087 
Table 1–Numerical distribution regarding Turkish participants’ responsesto the question 
of “Generally speaking, do you think that Turkey's membership of the European Union 
would be...?” (Eurobarometer 2005-2014) 
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Figure above shows the data visualization containing the results of Eurobarometer 
public opinion surveys from 2005 to 2014. The respective question of our focus has not 
been directed to the respondents in Eurobarometer 76,which has been conducted in 
November 2011; therefore, the Table 1 and Figure 1 lacks the data for the respective 
period. However, it is possible to view the general trend of the respective period.  
In general, it is clear that Turkish public’s view of Turkey’s membership to the EU 
would be ‘a good thing’ declined visibly throughout the years. The data of the first half 
of 2005 shows that 59% of the respondents view Turkish membership of EU would be 
‘a good thing’. The second half of 2005 shows a decline from 59% to 55% and finally a 
sharp one to43% by the first half of 2006, which resonates directly to a great loss of 
enthusiasm regarding EU membership especially when the percentages of the previous 
years are concerned. Although positive atmosphere generated with the opening of 
accession negotiations is visible on the first half of 2005, several developments seem to 
affect Turkish opinion in the following years.  
It can be clearly observed that Turkish public increasingly lost its enthusiasm towards 
the idea of EU membership within this respective period. Although the fraction that 
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Figure 2 – Percentile chart regarding Turkish participants’ responses to the question of 
“Generally speaking, do you think that Turkey's membership of the European Union 
would be...?” (Eurobarometer 2005-2014) 
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views the EU membership of Turkey to be ‘a good thing’ increases to approximately 
52% in the second half of 2006 and first half of 2007, when compared to previous years, 
the per cent that views EU membership as ‘a bad thing’ rose to 22. When compared to 
the results in 2004, this trend shows a great change. Back in 2004, the per cent that 
views EU membership of Turkey as ‘a good thing’ was 70, while only 9% of the 
respondents believed that it would be ‘a bad thing’.  
The reasons behind this great loss of support on the public part are to be concerned. 
Although a great decline is existent after 2004 until 2007, the general idea is that AKP 
government continued its reforms in conjunction with EU harmonization process. 
Although Turkey met new alternatives throughout this process, the EU hand of the 
foreign policy formation continued, despite the enthusiasm declined greatly on the 
government hand as well.  
It is already clear that the disappointment emerged both on the government and public 
front after the Cyprus Referendum of April 2004 constitutes a critical factor of the 
downtrend observed. The rate of respondents regarding EU membership of Turkey as ‘a 
good thing’ decreased to 43% in spring 2006; and this trend is highly crucial in 
identifying the Cyprus dispute as the main cause to this decline, since this rate of 43% 
demonstrates the views of the respondents in spring 2006, only a few months after the 
opening of accession negotiations with the EU. Turkish disappointment followed with 
the decision of the European Council in December 2006. This decision proposed 
Turkish compliance with the Additional Protocol to the Ankara Agreement, and stated 
that 8 chapters of the accession negotiations will not be opened and no chapters will be 
provisionally closed in the opposite case, Cyprus and France vetoed opening of several 
chapters in addition.  
The rejection of the Treaty establishing a constitution for Europe with referenda in May 
and June 2005 by the French and Dutch voters created further considerations regarding 
EU front. This rejection was perceived so as some member states of the EU are against 
further enlargement of Europe both in vertical and horizontal axis. Regarding Turkish 
accession, this perception caused several discussions and concepts to arise after 2006, 
such as ‘enlargement fatigue’, ‘absorption capacity’ and ‘privileged partnership’. Since 
the negotiations were blocked on several blocks, public support for EU membership in 
Turkey together with government’s enthusiasm started to present a downturn.  
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It would be fair to expect the Turkish public to decrease its support towards EU 
membership after the reservations of the EU member states came forth after the opening 
of the accession negotiations. It is highly known that the necessary reforms regarding 
the Copenhagen criteria requires Turkey to conduct reforms in some areas that are 
referred as the ‘sensitive issues’ of the Turkish nation. The abolition of the death 
penalty along with the Kurdish minority problem which are highly connected to the 
imprisonment and conviction to the leader of Kurdish PKK Abdullah Öcalan as 
examples confront the Turkish public in exchange for accession negotiations to 
conclude with the full membership prospect. It can be argued that Turkish public has 
tried to digest these reforms on the respective sensitive issues in exchange for a prospect 
of full membership to EU. However, when the growing opposition within the EU 
against Turkish membership started to be articulated in many platforms, the 
compromises Turkey made have lost meaning in the eyes of the public.  
The post-2005 period witnessed a gradual decline of public support towards EU 
membership of Turkey. One of the most important factors behind this gradual decline 
stands as Turkish economic orientation during this period in regards to its changing 
foreign policy incentives. Turkey, actually in line with its EU harmonization process 
has developed civilian policies that would eliminate all kinds of hostilities with its 
neighbors. These policies of Turkey enabled the foreign economic policy to be 
developed in a positive manner with the neighboring countries. The period of 2005 and 
follows witnessed Turkish foreign economic policy evolving into a more assertive one 
promoting export market diversification strategies especially towards Middle Eastern 
and North African countries.(Öniş & Güven, 2011)EU still standing as one of the 
largest trade partner, Turkey created itself new alternatives on the Eastern front that had 
enabled Turkey to pull itself out of the global economic crisis with minimum damage. 
On the public front, Turkey’s successful performance especially regarding 2008 global 
economic crisis created a much stronger image of Turkish economy, that would not 
need the EU anchor in terms of economic policies anymore. As proposed, Turkish 
public support to EU membership declines, when there is positive economic growth of 
Turkish economy is present.  
Scholars regard the post-2005 period not as a fear of losing national sovereignty or 
integrity, but as a period of AKP building up a more self-confident policy stance and 
discarding EU to be its only option for strategic partnership(Yaka, 2016).At this point, 
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the gradual shift from AKP from its EU membership project and pursuit of new 
alternatives for global cooperation recalls the idea that AKP’s commitment to the EU 
membership was motivated by its own domestic policy interests. In other words, in 
order for AKP to achieve its policy choices in the domestic arena, EU membership 
prospect and the necessary reforms for compliance constitute a great chance in the first 
half of 2000s. EU however has lost its appeal in the eyes of AKP government, since 
several legislations and features of EU appeared to be confounding AKP’s expectations.  
This approach of AKP’s domestic interests motivating its EU agenda comes forth with 
alternative motives. As Yaka discusses 
“AKP’s commitment to the EU membership project was motivated by its own 
agenda of weakening ‘the Kemalist-bureaucratic tutelage regime’ and its main 
institutions such as the National Security Council(MGK), by means of the EU 
adjustment regulations. The idea was that the EU accession process would permit 
the centrist conservative majority of large and small business leaders, large and 
small farmers, some civil servants, and workers to finally break hold of the 
Kemalist civil-military bureaucratic elite that has controlled the country, with some 
interruptions since 1923”(Yaka, 2016) 
AKP following the elections of 2007 with its higher percentage of votes intended to 
carry out several reforms regarding the fundamental religious freedoms independent 
from the EU harmonization agenda. It has been previously argued that AKP’s greater 
percentage of votes out of 2007 elections could have created AKP a platform in which it 
could carry necessary reforms in parallel with the EU harmonization process. However, 
the increased self-confidence of the government then presented an alternative policy 
approach to disregard its pro-EU reforms at a certain extent. This policy preference of 
AKP correlates with the argument that it has been trying to achieve its domestic policy 
interest under the umbrella of EU harmonization compliance, and gives the impression 
in this period that Turkey does not need EU anymore.  
Regarding year 2014, it must be clear that the rate of respondents that stated they do not 
know whether Turkish membership to the EU would be ‘a good thing’ or ‘a bad thing’ 
suddenly declines. In other words, some critical developments prior to year 2014 led 
Turkish public to form an opinion about Turkey’s EU membership prospect. These 
critical events would be first and foremost the Gezi Parkı protests in June 2013 and 
December 17-25 corruption scandals.  
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The Gezi Parkı protests were held against the government’s intention to build a 
shopping mall by destroying green space in Taksim Gezi Parkı district. The protests 
started with the reaction of a small group of environmentalists against the demolition of 
the park and then turned into a mass protests against the unlawful and acts of the 
government. The misuse of police force was obvious, and it created reactions from all 
around the world. These reactions did not only against the misuse of force, but also the 
cynical discourses that were made by the government officials. At that time, Recep 
Tayyip Erdoğan made critical statements that involved the messages that he sees and 
regards to the society as polarized by whether they support the government or support 
the protests held against it. Erdoğan’s and other government officials’ discourses clearly 
indicated that Turkey is drifting away from the rule of law. The methods used for 
suppression of the protests along with the declarations of the government officials 
created serious reservations and EU officials made serious criticisms regarding Turkish 
government and their behavior of supporting disproportionate use of force. At that 
point, the response of the government officials was harsh and it was implied that Turkey 
would not follow EU norms anymore. The Gezi Parkı protests constituted a breaking 
point regarding Turkey-EU relations. In result of the events, the Turkish society was 
polarized regarding their stance to the government and its policies, and declarations 
promoted this polarization further. In this manner, while a fraction of the society was at 
the opinion that Turkey under the rule of AKP government is in serious need of EU 
norms especially in terms of democratization, supporters of the AKP government were 
not. As a matter of fact, the constituency of AKP was highly supportive of the 
government policies and now became highly distanced towards EU. The Gezi Parkı 
protests and its aftermath therefore was important for Turkish public to form an opinion 
about EU membership, since the polarization that it caused bolstered up the idea.  
Another incident that has led the public to form an opinion about EU membership was 
December 17-25 corruption scandals. A legal investigation was launched in December 
2013 involving AKP ministers and members of their families with the accusation of 
involvement in corruption. Erdoğan’s response at this point was critical, since he 
attributed this operation to be a ‘judicial coup’, which then led AKP government to 
implement legal changes on the judiciary law. AKP government perceived the existing 
procedure as a threat and despite all opposition, AKP government succeeded to 
restructure the High Council of Judges and Prosecutors. This restructuring attempt 
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along with changes in the judicial law once again created serious concerns for the EU 
front and The Council of Europe expressed condemnation regarding these 
developments. The European Commission on the other hand criticized the 
developments and mentioned that Turkey has to become condensed on democratic 
norms. These events did not only create reservations for the EU officials, but also for a 
fraction of Turkish public as well. A serious proportion of the supporters of the AKP 
government continued their support unconditionally by referring this operation as 
fictionalized, while others carry serious concerns regarding democratic norms in 
Turkey. This corruption scandal on the other hand inflamed the fraction of public that 
were already concerned about the functioning of democracy in Turkey, which resulted 
in public to perceive EU membership as ‘a good thing’ for Turkey, which would 
eventually help reconstruct democratic norms in the country.  
The changing policy preferences of AKP regarding membership to EU would create a 
need for explanation on the public front as well. As I claimed before, Turkish public is 
prone to construct its preferences in accordance with the stances of the political elite. 
Proposition 2 touched upon in the theoretical framework chapter suggests that Turkish 
public support for EU membership increases when cues provided by the political 
leaders present positive attitudes towards EU membership. When this proposition is 
approached with the explained policy conduct of AKP pursuing policies of its interest 
and locate itself in within the frame in accordance as it has done with the EU 
membership project, it must be said that in order for AKP to conduct its preferred 
policies with continual public support, it then highly important to what extent the 
political elite is capable of shaping public opinion regardless of other determinants. At 
this point, the proposition deserves stress in the Turkish public opinion formation.  
The shift of AKP’s stance away from the EU membership prospect is obvious. The 
features and benefits of the EU-AKP made use of for promotion- stand still. If so, what 
can be the main determinant behind the correlative decrease of public support towards 
EU with the decrease of government enthusiasm towards the EU membership project? 
My answer would be the political cues provided to the public. The experience regarding 
the sensitive issues to a certain extent proved that these sensitive issues regarding 
compliance to Copenhagen Criteria might be overcome, just as the hesitant views of the 
EU officials. However, the utility-based considerations of the prospective EU 
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membership stand still, even if Turkey’s enthusiasm gradually fades away. At this 
point, it must be underlined that Turkish public support towards EU membership having 
positive correlation with the stance of the government towards EU signifies that Turkish 
public is highly receptive of the political cues provided by the elite. On a contrary 
scenario, the government must have justified its loss of enthusiasm regarding EU 
membership without manipulating the opinion of the public. However, as mentioned 
before, domestic interests of the government, re-election and electoral support being on 
the top, motivate political elite to shape public opinion by delivering cues regarding 
their policy stance.  
3.3. IMAGE OF THE EU IN THE EYES OF TURKISH PUBLIC 
 Veryposit
ive 
Fairlyposit
ive 
Neutr
al 
Fairlynega
tive 
Verynegat
ive 
Do 
not 
kno
w 
Positi
ve 
Negati
ve 
Total # 
of 
participa
nts 
2005-1 305 305 118 98 148 31 610 246 1861 
2005-2 292 306 152 92 105 58 598 197 1800 
2006-1 191 241 228 139 126 79 432 265 1701 
2006-2 70 255 362 213 76 25 325 289 1615 
2007-1 271 261 119 118 154 77 532 271 1803 
2007-2 236 246 165 119 161 78 482 279 1766 
2008-1 173 323 162 130 144 71 496 274 1773 
2008-2 115 307 167 167 139 108 422 306 1731 
2009-1 151 310 203 154 126 62 461 280 1747 
2009-2 93 333 235 177 95 69 426 272 1700 
2010-1 75 293 224 169 161 79 368 330 1699 
2010-2 82 240 158 158 156 206 322 315 1637 
2011-1 94 269 222 184 146 86 362 330 1693 
2011-2 65 220 209 212 205 90 285 416 1702 
2012-1 53 265 265 281 92 44 318 373 1691 
2012-2 51 253 253 238 108 97 304 346 1650 
2013-1 96 253 254 215 127 57 348 342 1692 
2013-2 99 104 226 205 71 296 203 277 1481 
2014-1 121 321 320 149 90 26 442 238 1707 
2014-2 95 330 306 163 106 88 425 269 1782 
Table 2– Numerical distribution regarding Turkish participants’ responses to the 
question of “In general, does the European Union conjure up for you a very positive, 
fairly positive, neutral, fairly negative or very negative image?” (Eurobarometer 2005-
2014) 
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Figure 3 – Percentile chart regarding Turkish participants’ responses to the question of 
“In general, does the European Union conjure up for you a very positive, fairly positive, 
neutral, fairly negative or very negative image?” (Eurobarometer 2005-2014) 
 
A similar picture of developments in public opinion can be observed using the question 
of ‘In general, does the European Union conjure up for you a very positive, fairly 
positive, neutral, fairly negative or very negative image?’ The most outstanding data of 
this graph belongs to years 2005 and 2006. The downward trend of the fraction that 
view EU as ‘positive’ is especially sharp between these years. Although the ‘positive’ 
series climb up to 15% in the first half of 2007 once again after hitting 4% in the second 
half of 2006, the downfall continued for years. However, throughout these years 
witnessing a downward trend of people viewing EU as ‘positive’, the percentage of 
people that are neutral gradually increased and hit 15%by the end of 2012, and then 
continued increasing to 18% in the first half of 2014. It is visible that this downtrend of 
2005 and 2006 is followed by an increasing trend continued until the end of the first 
half of 2007, which then is followed by a gradual decline until 2014. It is possible to 
associate the uptrend in the first half of the 2007 with the repetitive emphasis of AKP’s 
election manifestos.  
The trend of the respondents who stated to view EU ‘neutral’ shows a sharp increase 
that starts at the end of 2005 continues until the end of 2006. This sharp increase can be 
explained with the correspondence of opening of accession negotiations that has been 
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promoted by the AKP government for several years and the disappointment created by 
several voices from EU to approach Turkish membership with great hesitations within 
the same period. The stance of EU in the Cyprus dispute issue of Turkey has also 
created great disappointment both in the government and public fronts. The bold and 
promoting discourses provided by the political elite for several years regarding Turkish 
membership to EU and the disappointing developments thereafter have created an 
atmosphere where the respondents in that period cannot locate themselves in the 
juncture and regard themselves as neutral concerning EU’ image.  
The alternation of EU’s image for Turkish public may well be linked both to internal 
dynamics of the EU, the developments regarding Turkey’s membership within EU and 
policy preferences of Turkey. Öniş and Yılmaz also touches upon the effect of media 
coverage as “The media representations of Europe in Turkey as a monolithic bloc 
contributed to this change of mood”(Öniş & Yılmaz, 2009), by referring to the loss of 
enthusiasm Turkish public went through and the changing image of EU for Turkish 
public. When the internal dynamics of EU is to be discussed, it can be claimed that 
economic crisis of 2008 indeed affected the image of EU in the eyes of Turkish public. 
Furthermore, reservations of some member states regarding further enlargement of EU, 
with Turkey in particular, did well affected Turkish public support in a negative 
manner. The Cyprus dispute and the attitude EU adopted in this respect did also affect 
EU’s image in the eyes of Turkish public. Furthermore, Turkey’s new alternatives as 
international partners may well affected this trend in the way that Turkey now pose a 
stance that is not obliged to EU as before.  
Furthermore, as mentioned before, the outcome of Brussels Summit in terms of attitudes 
of France and Germany created a serious nationalistic backlash in Turkey, as Öniş and 
Yılmaz stresses(Öniş & Yılmaz, 2009). They further argue that the coverage of these 
developments by the mass media along with their approach to Europe as a whole, not 
specific to the member states increased further antipathy towards EU in public at 
large(Öniş & Yılmaz, 2009). The downward trend of Turkish public support for EU 
membership along with the image of EU in the eyes of Turkish society has been 
inflamed by the questioning of Turkey’s membership by EU’s political elite.  
Along with the atmosphere created by EU’s political elite towards Turkey’s 
membership, the constitutional crisis within the EU has been represented with 
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exaggeration by Turkish mass media. This factor as a matter of course played a 
significant role in shaping public opinion of Turkey in a negative manner. This fact did 
not only decrease public support towards EU, but also made Turkey to perceive the 
identity crisis of EU from a different perspective.  
The negative image that has started to arise within Turkish public has also been 
associated with the perception of the ‘West’. Öniş and Yılmaz argue that Turkey’s 
relations with the United States already constitute a great factor that shapes Turkish 
relations with Europe. Their approach carries along the assumption that Turkish public 
perceives ‘West’ as a whole without necessarily separating Europe from United States, 
which comes from past experiences and cultural habits(Öniş & Yılmaz, 2009). As Yaka 
argues, Turkish relations with EU are highly relevant with the concept of ‘common 
sense’(Yaka, 2016). Her work further suggests that Turkish common sense creates 
confusion around identity-based issues, which causes Turkish society’s conceptions 
about the EU to rally around a mix of negative and positive conceptions that are open to 
rapid transformation in case of any change in political conjuncture(Yaka, 2016). 
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3.4. TRUST IN THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT 
  Tendtotrust Tend not 
totrust 
Do not know Total # of 
participants 
2005-1 EB63 760 212 33 1005 
2005-2 EB64 723 217 65 1005 
2006-1 EB65 677 271 57 1005 
2006-2 EB66 635 333 37 1005 
2007-1 EB67 707 249 42 998 
2007-2 EB68 635 296 74 1005 
2008-1 EB69 467 475 60 1002 
2008-2 EB70 482 470 51 1003 
2009-1 EB71 576 384 45 1005 
2009-2 EB72 507 453 42 1002 
2010-1 EB73 429 519 51 999 
2010-2 EB74 445 499 56 1000 
2011-1 EB75 578 370 52 1000 
2011-2 EB76 488 447 66 1001 
2012-1 EB77 572 366 62 1000 
2012-2 EB78 450 474 76 1000 
2013-1 EB79 487 467 48 1002 
2013-2 EB80 358 570 74 1002 
2014-1 EB81 530 450 46 1026 
2014-2 EB82 495 521 71 1087 
Table 3–Numerical distribution regarding Turkish participants’ responses to the 
question of “For the Turkish Government, please tell me if you tend to trust it ort end 
not to trust it.” (Eurobarometer 2005-2014) 
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The survey questions regarding Turkish public’s trust in the Turkish government and 
the Turkish parliament may enhance our understanding of formation of public 
preference and whether it is correlated with the government and parliament’s positions 
on EU related issues. It is clearly seen that the fraction that tend to trust the government 
and the parliament in Turkey declines in that vein when the view of the EU membership 
and the image of EU figures are taken into consideration.  
When Figure above is viewed, it is visible that the tendency of Turkish public to trust in 
the national government showed a gradual decline from 75% in 2005 down to 45% by 
the end of 2014, with the exception of an increase in 2007. This exception of increase in 
2007 from 63% to 70% can be associated with the exceptional performance of the AKP 
government in the elections that is to take the office once again with a higher percentage 
of support. The first half of 2008 however witnesses a sharp decline once again to 48% 
and the rates did not see their highest peaks they hit at 2005 again. This sharp decline 
can be explained with the case of the Constitution Court regarding closure of AKP with 
the accusation of violation of secular constitutional order of the state.   
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Figure 4 – Percentile chart regarding Turkish participants’ responses to the question of 
“For the Turkish Government, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust 
it.” (Eurobarometer 2005-2014) 
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It is clear that the AKP government has developed effective policies regarding 
management of the global economic crisis. Disregarding the foreign economic policies 
and bilateral relations with the respective countries, the AKP government portrayed a 
very optimistic picture by diverting the attention away from the shortcomings of the 
economic policies while stressing progress of Turkey’s improving image among the 
region as a key player, especially focusing on the relations with the Middle Eastern 
neighbors. The domestic issues regarding secularism and identity enabled the AKP 
government to distract the public from the technical economic issues and respective 
economic policies. The improving relations with the Middle Eastern neighbors both in 
economic and cultural respects helped the AKP government to paint a picture of success 
in terms of foreign policies that portrayed to carry out the aim to become a key player in 
the region. In the domestic front, the failure of the opposition in attracting attention to 
the effects of the economic crisis such as low income rates and high unemployment 
enabled the AKP government to maintain support from the public and pass through the 
local elections of 2009 without any certain loss of support.  
When the data regarding Turkish public’s tendency to trust in the national government 
and the national parliament is concerned, it is visible that the following period of 2008 
did witness an increase of the rate of the respondents who declared that they ‘tend to 
trust’, while the rate of the respondents who declared that they ‘tend not to trust’ 
decreased. Given that fact that Turkish economy has undergone certain complications 
such as high unemployment rates and poverty, through these rates it is visible that the 
AKP government succeeded to portray a highly promising picture in regards to 
Turkey’s crisis management skills along with Turkey’s position as a key actor among 
the region.  
The reason why these findings constitute great importance is that concerning our claim 
that public opinion is formed correlatively with the cues that are delivered by the 
government officials and political elite in general. Although the positive percentages 
and uptrends may well be linked with the trust the public have in the government and 
the parliament, actually downtrends can be also explained with the distrust the public 
have in these institutions. 
When Figure 3 is analyzed together with Figure 2, the positive correlation in between 
becomes visible. Proposition 3 explained further in the theoretical framework chapter in 
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terms of expectancies in regard, suggests that Turkish public support to EU membership 
increases, when there is an increase in the tendency to trust the national government. In 
this respect, it would be fair to say that statistical data shows a link in between.(Öniş, 
The Triumph of Conservative Globalism: The Political Economy of the AKP Era, 2012) 
3.5. TRUST IN THE TURKISH PARLIAMENT 
  Tendtotrust Tend not 
totrust 
Do not know Total # of 
participants 
2005-1 EB63 734 226 45 1005 
2005-2 EB64 727 213 65 1005 
2006-1 EB65 685 266 54 1005 
2006-2 EB66 641 326 38 1005 
2007-1 EB67 736 221 41 998 
2007-2 EB68 642 278 84 1004 
2008-1 EB69 475 462 65 1002 
2008-2 EB70 492 448 63 1003 
2009-1 EB71 582 371 52 1005 
2009-2 EB72 511 436 55 1002 
2010-1 EB73 455 484 61 1000 
2010-2 EB74 470 473 57 1000 
2011-1 EB75 549 390 62 1001 
2011-2 EB76 444 483 74 1001 
2012-1 EB77 536 392 72 1000 
2012-2 EB78 441 476 82 999 
2013-1 EB79 447 503 50 1000 
2013-2 EB80 382 555 64 1001 
2014-1 EB81 556 420 50 1026 
2014-2 EB82 546 462 79 1087 
Table 4–Numerical distribution regarding Turkish participants’ responses to the 
question of “For the Turkish Parliament, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not 
to trust it.” (Eurobarometer 2005-2014) 
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As explained in the theoretical framework chapter, the preference formation of the 
public is in different terms highly related to policy choices of the policy makers, while 
different models of preference formation suggest that irrespective of the provider of the 
information, the deliverance, the content and the timing are of critical importance.  
Although it is visible that support for EU membership declines parallel with Turkish 
public trust in the government and the parliament, this trend can be explained with 
several different approaches. The first would be that public opinion is vulnerable to 
political cues regardless of the source provided the cue. In other words, even though 
Turkish people do not tent to trust their government or their parliament, they tend to be 
affected by the discourses provided by those non-trusted persons or institutions. At this 
point, the information delivered carries great importance in terms of its tone and 
content.  
Another approach may be linked to the overall distrust the public may posses towards 
the whole political environment, including foreign policy. This case in regards to this 
approach might create the scene that Turkish people considering the instability of the 
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Figure 5 – Percentile chart regarding Turkish participants’ responses to the question of 
“For theTurkish Parliament, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it.” 
(Eurobarometer 2005-2014) 
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whole political environment that would lead them to withdraw their support to policy 
choices of the government including EU membership agenda. The statements 
government officials made were actually inconsistent with the downward trend of 
public support. The officials painted a promising picture that the reforms were 
continuing at the same pace during the years of 2006 and 2007, however the 
Eurobarometer survey does not tell the same hopeful story regarding public support.  
When compared with the trends of tendency to trust in the national government, Figure-
4 constitutes high similarity. The tendency of the Turkish public shows a gradual 
decline from 73% in the first half of 2005 with respectable decline down to 38% by the 
end of 2013. While this trend can be associated with the trust public have in the national 
government as a matter of course, it may also cue us about the public’s reservations 
regarding the separation of powers within the Turkish democratic sphere. This 
explanation may become more understandable if the growing self-confidence and 
hegemonic stance of the AKP government is concerned.  
Proposition 4 suggest that Turkish public support to EU membership increases, when 
there is an increase in the tendency to trust the national parliament. When the respective 
figures are analyzed, this correlation in between becomes visible, as it has been 
regarding trust to national government. The reasons behind this correlation carry great 
similarities with the one’s behind the proposition regarding the national government.  
The period of accession negotiations indeed paved the way for AKP to conduct policies 
of its interest. However, the longer this period lasted, reforms necessitating highly 
sensitive issues to be revised started to appear at a greater extent, which has created 
certain resistance at the public level. The public viewed the atmosphere as so that in the 
sake of EU membership a lot of compromises has been made, however the outcome still 
stood unclear. Therefore, trust in the government and the parliament declines in 
correlation with the public support to EU membership. 
When considering the overall display, the data covering ‘trust’ of Turkish public in the 
national government and parliament showing a decreasing trend signals that although a 
mistrust in these institutions exist, Turkish public still takes the political discourses into 
consideration whether consciously or not. To be clearer, except a few years of gap, 
Turkish public’s attitudes towards EU is framing a collateral picture with the policy 
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choices of the government towards EU membership process. To put more precisely, 
although Turkish public lose its trust to the national government or parliament at a 
substantial degree, the fact that public support more or less goes in parallel with the 
demeanor of the political elite promotes the idea claiming the substantial effect of 
political cues.  
Johansson-Nogués and Jonasson touch upon Turkish public’s perceptions of the 
government and they cite Aydınlı and state that AKP’s stable and strong political 
leadership has boosted the confidence of Turkish public(Johansson-Nogues & Jonasson, 
2011). AKP however has been criticized by many for putting party interests at higher 
priority than state interests. However still, it is fair to expect public to view the 
government and its institutions as to pursue state interest and deliver necessary policies 
in this manner, while ensuring political stability along with national security.  
 61 
 
CHAPTER 4. 
 
 
POLITICAL DISCOURSE SIGNALINGCHANGES IN POLICY 
PREFERENCES OF THE AKP GOVERNMENT 
Basing our analysis to the discourses of the political elite in fact may not reward us with 
concrete and precise statistical results, but if not with content base inferences. Thus, this 
analysis may help us to comprehend the change of tone and attitude of the political elite 
in a particular period, which may further clue us in their policy stances.  When the 
discourses of the Turkish political elite in the pre-2005 and post-2005 periods are 
concerned, the loss of enthusiasm that has been mentioned before is already visible. 
Together with this, continuing existence of emphasis on the EU membership and reform 
may also be considered as a part of strategic cue giving, since each day without the 
achievement of EU membership prospect, which has been carried out with great 
enthusiasm and hope for a period, may carry the risk to create an unsuccessful image of 
government in the eyes of the public. Therefore, the discourses belong to the post-2005 
period are expected to carry emphasis on the obstacles EU created on the process.  
 
The statements of Turkish officials, in terms of their content and changes they 
underwent, are important in order to empirically discuss Turkey’s position regarding 
EU and the project of full membership. Since the statements made by government 
officials signal the policy preferences of the government against EU, the content of 
these statements may well clue us both in the direction Turkey pursues towards EU and 
in the image of the EU in the minds of political elite. The discourses especially made by 
the officials of the AKP government, and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in particular carry 
critical importance, since he stands as the opinion leader of the constituency of the 
AKP(Kalaycıoğlu, 2013). Erdoğan with his highly strong rhetoric possess the skills to 
successfully mobilize and manipulate the public. When the recent events and Erdoğan’s 
comments in respect are considered, it is visible that Erdoğan’s declarations not only 
carry the ability to mobilize its supporters, but also manipulate and provoke the fraction 
that are opposing his and AKP government’s policies and stance.  
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 The first discourse to be viewed is existent within news articles of all news outlets. The 
celebration ceremony that have been done after the date were set in 2004 for the 
opening of accession negotiations with the EU as 3rd of October appeared in almost all 
news sources back at the time. The development was celebrated with great excitement, 
and fireworks were set off. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan announced the date 
of the beginning of accession negotiations during his public speech and stated, “There 
are 39 years on one side, and 2 on the other”(Radikal, 2004), while declaring the day as 
feast. By this statement, Erdoğan underlined AKP’s success that they had accelerated 
the EU membership process greatly by setting a date for accession negotiations, while 
previous governments failed to do so.  
In 2005, Erdoğan during his speech at the grand opening of a shopping mall in İstanbul 
stated that  
“I do not state a specific date for EU membership, but we believe in one thing. We 
work; we do our share of the task as we have done until now. Then we will expect 
them to do their share of the task. On October 3, Turkey achieved her goal that has 
been tried to achieve nearly for 40 years. Turkey now does not talk about the 
negotiation process, but about the accession.”(Milliyet, 2005) 
Again in 2005, Erdoğan once again underscored the government’s purpose to follow the 
necessary reform agenda by saying “Turkey’s direction Turkey will follow is definite. 
In case of any problem, we will turn Copenhagen criteria into Ankara criteria and carry 
on our path”(CNN Türk, 2005). Additionally he continued with his emphasis that 
Turkey now is on the path of full membership and it is unnecessary to put privileged 
partnership prospect on the table. Furthermore, regarding the referenda conducted in 
France Erdoğan stated that “It would be wrong to link French referendum to Turkish 
membership. French people exerted their willpower towards the Constitutional Treaty. 
That has nothing to do with Turkey. The referendum was not related to Turkey’s 
membership, but to the Constitutional Treaty”(CNN Türk, 2005). 
When we come to 2007, Prime Minister Erdoğan changed his tone against EU and 
stated: “We expect sincerity and honesty from the European Union. If the ones who find 
us successful still block our way, then that is political.” Through this statement, 
Erdoğan made it clear that the Turkish government started not to take EU’s position to 
granted and has hesitations regarding the membership process”(NTV, 2007) 
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Abdullah Gül in 2007, during his term of presidency delivered this speech regarding EU 
membership: 
“We should follow our path of EU membership that we have started with the 
accession negotiations in October 2005 with strong-will. The political and 
economic reforms of EU membership project have to be conducted with greater 
dedication; this is necessary for our country. The political conjuncture in Europe 
can always change. The important thing for us is being able to open and close 
negotiation chapters by our own in order to achieve modern standards. Turkey that 
conducts its reforms without any hindrance and consequently conclude total 
harmonization with European Union will eventually make its own choice”(NTV, 
2007) 
This statement of Abdullah Gül can be viewed as delivered in a more tolerant attitude. 
He touches upon the factors that necessitates Turkey to confront in the process of 
membership, while making clear that this process is still of critical importance for 
Turkey at large.  
During the Turkey-EU Joint Advisory Committee Meeting in April 2008, Turkish 
officials made very important statements regarding Turkey-EU relations within the 
speeches they delivered. Prime Minister Erdoğan’s speech is as follows: 
“Turkey does not have any hesitation or drawback regarding joining EU. Turkey 
continues to follow its path with excitement despite of all efforts of hindrance, all 
developments that are decreasing her motivation. We believe that we will enrich 
EU. Our aim is to lessen EU’s burden, not to be another one. No country on the 
entire world has the capacity to go further alone without any cooperation. That 
period was long gone. Each country has to integrate with each other; the situation 
requires cooperation” (Türkiye Ziraat Odaları Birliği, 2008) 
Erdoğan’s speech still seems to carry elements of hope. However, with his great skills 
of rhetoric, he did not hesitate to deliver his message between the lines. Erdoğan 
underlines that membership of Turkey to EU will bring along benefits to both sides, 
while signaling that it is apparent Turkey’s accession process have been complicated by 
various measures.  
At the same meeting, Abdullah Gül delivered a speech as well. Regarding his speech, it 
visible that it again carries more moderate elements than Erdoğan’s. President Abdullah 
Gül’s speech is as follows:  
The political disputes are due to the nature of democracy. The hardest thing along 
the membership process is to maintain public support, and non-governmental 
organizations have their duties in this regard. Turkey-EU relations have two 
standpoints; the first would be the governments and the parliaments, and the 
second would be the non-governmental organizations. The dialogue in between EU 
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and Turkey has to be enhanced in order to conduct a more stable negotiation 
process. In Turkey, sometimes several misunderstandings occur. In this respect, I 
request non-governmental organizations to continue their works in great 
pace”(Türkiye Ziraat Odaları Birliği, 2008) 
Gül makes strong emphasis on the importance of public support in the process of 
negotiations. The duties of non-governmental organizations are stressed in order to 
continue stable negotiations. The fact that Gül pays great value on public opinion is of 
critical importance regarding our claim. His approach signals that he is well aware of 
the fact that public opinion plays a critical role in shaping policy preferences. Therefore, 
his aim to mobilize masses is highly apparent in his speech, especially with his 
reference to the capabilities of the Turkish society.  
His speech continues as follows: 
“The negotiation process is not easy, and Turkey is conscious of this fact. Our 
commitment derives its roots from our society’s nature and is therefore very strong. 
Turkish society is highly determined to the continuity of this process. Our 
parliament always conducted legislations that are of great importance for 
strengthening relations with Europe”(Türkiye Ziraat Odaları Birliği, 2008) 
When it comes to 2012 we see that, advisor of Prime Minister Erdoğan, İbrahim Kalın 
stated that “Turkey is beginning to read history from a non-Eurocentric point of view 
and to recognize other possibilities in modern history”. This statement is of critical 
importance, since Turkey considering other alternatives as cooperation partners have 
been signaled through his words precisely. Turkey, considering new alternatives have 
not been signaled by Kalın only. Suat Kınıkoğlu, a member of AKP back in 2010 also 
stated “Turkey does not really need the EU anymore. Its economy is strong enough to 
do without a union that is struggling with its own financial problems.” (Hürriyet Daily 
News, 2010) This short statement of his carries great importance in terms of analysis of 
the government’s tendencies. The content of this saying makes it clear that Turkey did 
perceive EU as a necessary partner that would contribute Turkey in economic spheres. 
His emphasis on Turkish economy scoring really well carries on with his criticism of 
EU’s financial problems regarding Eurozone crisis.  
On the other front, Foreign Minister Davutoğlu’s speech back in 2006 states Turkey’s 
intentions clearly; “Turkey cannot wait forever at the door of EU, and needs to develop 
a genuinely multidirectional foreign policy by utilizing its geostrategic advantages”. It 
shows that Turkey’s efforts to create strategic partnerships dates long back, and in this 
instance of stagnation within the process carried on with the EU, Turkey may well carry 
 65 
 
on with its other alternatives of strategic partnerships. Actually in a few years, Turkey 
accelerated her efforts in the direction of this alternative.  
Moreover, Davutoğlu argued in 2013 that “If Europe wants to be geo-politically 
relevant, it should have access to Asia, should have access to the Middle East, to 
Caspian Sea, Indian Sea and even Africa, they need Turkey”(Davutoğlu, 
2013).(Doğangil, 2013)This statement long after the loss of enthusiasm towards EU 
membership holds the mission to express the possible advantages Turkey would create 
for EU. In doing so, I suggest that it does not carry the aim to reanimate the enthusiastic 
atmosphere of EU membership process back in 2004, but show the respective 
interlocutors that Turkey now is moving towards new horizons. These interlocutors do 
not constitute only the EU member states, but also the general public at large. This 
approach is indeed compatible with the attitude Turkish public has towards EU, and 
towards the new alternative partners of Turkey as well.  
In November 2009, Cemil Çiçek, Turkish Deputy Prime Minister states as such 
regarding Cyprus dispute; “If Turkey would be forced to choose between supporting 
either EU membership or Turkish Cypriots, Turkey’s choice forever will be to stand 
next to Turkish Cypriots. Everybody should understand this”(Çoğal, 2011) 
As we hit 2013, Prime Minister Erdoğan appears in January on national television with 
a pretentious statement. Erdoğan stated clearly “I have requested clearly from Putin to 
include us in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization”. In response to further questions, 
he continued “Shanghai Cooperation Organization is well a better alternative for Turkey 
than EU. We have no more patience regarding the EU accession process. We will do 
everything in the interests of Turkey and we will join alliances that the country will 
benefit from” (Radikal, 2013) 
Egemen Bağış, Minister for EU Affairs, in 2013 after Gezi Parkı protests responded to 
EU officials that has criticized Turkish government for exerting disproportionate force 
against its citizens as follows:  
“We have been seeing that some European parliamentarians and officials are 
irresponsibly making very bold and irrational speeches. It is nonsense that some 
European parliamentarians and officials believe that suspending Turkey’s EU 
accession process would be a threat for Turkey. Suspending Turkey’s EU accession 
process is in fact would be a threat for EU, but not Turkey. Turkey has the most 
reformist and strongest government in Europe”(Bağış, 2013) 
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It is clear now that the ruling government of AKP has been promoting several specific 
policies that are of great importance regarding its electoral constituents. As it has been 
the case for several times, the desires and necessary adjustments that EU require from 
Turkey to meet have contradicted AKP’s strict and deep-seated policies that would 
attract great negative reactions if changes would have been applied. At this point, the 
domestic gains of AKP that are the continuing support by its electorate and 
correspondingly its durability in office are of greater importance. Therefore, AKP along 
with the opposition has to carry balancing policy changes. The success here would be 
on the execution o necessary policy changes carried out by the government as a whole, 
while gratifying the public as well. Therefore, the balancing elements in the discourses 
of the political elite should not be discarded. 
The relation between the embraced political discourses and the Eurobarometer data 
covering the respective period they have been delivered is of critical importance. When 
examined in detail, it can be seen that the public support to EU membership moves in 
correlation with political leaders’ tendencies of policy formation that are cued to public 
through their individual statements. Since the general assumption is that a regular 
citizen of Turkey would not be capable of comprehending relevant developments and 
their consequences without being guided by an upper mind, it would be fair to await the 
citizen to perceive the existing scene by creating impressions being influenced by the 
authorities.  
When the statements of the Turkish officials are examined with the background of 
Eurobarometer data regarding support for EU membership of Turkey, the conjunction is 
to be seen. As a matter of course, -as a strategic political maneuvering tool I suggest-, 
the discourses of political leaders vary in terms of attitude and tone. When Abdullah 
Gül’s and Tayyip Erdoğan’s statements corresponding to same period are in focus, it is 
clear that Gül has been trying to create a more promising picture, while Erdoğan’s 
attitude gradually becomes more intolerant.  
As the overall periodical change in the discourses of the Turkish political elite is 
viewed, it is visible that the change of tone and attitude of the discourses indeed carry 
resemblance with the periodical change of the public opinion. However, as mentioned 
before, the selected discourses might lack significance in terms of statistical analysis. 
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Even so, it is worth mentioning that the general trend reflected within the discourse 
analysis have parallels with the trend of Turkish public opinion.  
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CHAPTER 5. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
It is now beyond dispute that public opinion formation is highly vulnerable to both 
many endogenous and exogenous factors. As many scholars argue, factors such as 
religiosity, national identity and individual utility-based determinants are of great 
importance in Turkey in the process of public opinion formation especially towards the 
idea of EU membership. This thesis however proposed an alternative approach to public 
opinion formation in Turkey towards EU membership and with the help of 
Eurobarometer survey data and data regarding growth of Turkish economy, the given 
propositions have been analyzed.  
The first data helped us to evaluate Turkish economic growth rate in relation to Turkish 
public support to EU membership were examined with regards to the evolution of 
Turkish foreign economic policy and its reflections to the domestic front since the 
beginning of 2000s.Turkish public’s support for EU membership shows an increase in 
the first half of 2000s, especially after the economic crisis of 2001. AKP promoting EU 
membership prospect as its priority gained remarkable support in 2002 general 
elections, since the public perceived the situation to be in need of EU anchor in terms of 
economic regulations. AKP, at its first years in office continued to promote the EU 
membership idea while sustaining remarkable economic growth. In line with EU norms, 
AKP government further implemented civilian approach to its foreign policy, and 
sustained successful economic and diplomatic relationships with the countries in the 
Middle East, North Africa and Central Asia. These economic relations and 
diversification of the export market enabled Turkey to sustain remarkable economic 
growth and recover fast after the global economic crisis of 2008. This diversification of 
markets brought Turkey new incentives and promoted the idea that Turkey is not 
depended on the EU anymore, especially regarding economic means. This did not only 
promote AKP government’s self-confidence, but also affected the public front so that 
the EU membership prospect became less interesting day by day. Although the Arab 
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Spring affected Turkey’s export market negatively, EU still stood as one of the largest 
trade partners of Turkey. The AKP government and the Turkish public with the 
changing dynamics of economic relations were confident in terms of economic rates, 
and economic prospects that EU would provide became less and less attractive as time 
passes. The analysis of the developments, their aftermath and the respective economic 
data were present for being able to create a linkage to public opinion formation in 
relation.  Regarding the analysis of proposition claiming‘ Turkish public support for EU 
membership declines when there is a positive growth in the Turkish economy’, a 
significant positive correlation has been found. The data analysis brought forward that 
when Turkish economy progresses in a positive trend, the trend of support for EU 
membership tends to show a decline. The data analysis blended with historical analysis 
brought forward that Turkish public perceives EU as an economic anchor to a certain 
extent, and tends to be more supportive of the idea of EU membership, in case of any 
presence of negative economic indicators. 
The propositions concerning tendency of the Turkish public to trust in the government 
and the parliament showed great resemblance. The propositions hold that Turkish public 
support to EU membership increases, when there is an increase in the tendency to trust 
the national government and Turkish public support to EU membership increases, when 
there is an increase in the tendency to trust the national parliament. Indeed, when the 
respective data has been analyzed together with the data of Turkish public support to 
EU membership, it is visible that the trend of support for EU membership tends to 
increase in correlation with Turkish public’s tendency towards trusting in the national 
parliament and the government increases. The changes in the tendencies to trust the 
national government and the parliament are observed to show interconnection with the 
economic performance of the country. When the respective data are viewed, Turkish 
public’s tendency to trust in the national government and the parliament goes in line 
with the economic rates of the country in the respective period of time.  These data on 
the other hand may well be linked to Turkish government’s stance against the EU 
membership idea, as well as the overall trust the public carry for the government and the 
parliament, as well as their presumptions over the international political stability of such 
choice. On the other hand, it must be clear that with its successful performance 
especially regarding economic outcomes, the AKP government did not only gained a 
respectable proportion of constituency, but also created a highly self-confident image as 
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the years passed. Although there have been incidents creating reservations about 
Turkish government’s commitment to democratic norms over the years, the fraction that 
carry these reservations are outnumbered when compared to the supporters of the 
government. The analysis considering above-mentioned factors reveals that the 
developments both on the international and domestic fronts in time altered the public’s 
perceptions and tendencies of trust against the government and the parliament, which 
eventually affected public’s opinion towards EU membership. 
The analysis of the proposition “Turkish public support for EU membership increases 
when cues provided by the political leaders present positive attitudes towards EU 
membership” lacked numerical data regarding cues presenting elite attitudes to infer 
strong empirical conclusion. Therefore, the determinative elements behind the trend of 
public support to EU membership have been analyzed, and then a linkage between the 
trend and these elements has been searched for. In order to strengthen this linkage, the 
discourses of the Turkish political elite have been analyzed in respect to particular 
periods, while the developments regarding Turkish membership to the EU also have 
been analyzed in a historical and critical context. Thereupon I claim that Turkish public 
support for EU membership increases, when positive stances of the political elite are 
reflected to the public through political cues. Although not yet certain in an empirical 
context, I propose that Turkish public opinion on EU membership is highly volatile to 
changes in the attitudes of the Turkish political elite.  
Following the assumption that a great amount of information the public receive comes 
from the political elite regarding foreign policies and their consequences, it must be 
acknowledged that the messages/cues that are provided by the political elite are of 
critical importance in the process of public opinion formation. In respect to Turkish 
public opinion on EU membership, I claim that this argument is also valid. However, 
the empirical research on the extent of the influence exerted to the public through 
political cues can be focus of further research.  
Regarding all discussed propositions above, it must be acknowledged that there may be 
other variables to influence these trends that are now unknown to us. Besides, possible 
influences of endogenous and exogenous factors on public opinion formation should not 
be discarded. In regards to Turkish public support to EU membership, the opinion 
formation process accommodates several factors that are prone to prompt changes. 
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Progress of Turkish economy, tendency to trust in the national government and the 
parliament and political cues provided by the Turkish political elite I claim to be among 
the most influential factors shaping Turkish public opinion on EU membership between 
2005 and 2014.  
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